By: Huseyin Piran

Aug 18, 2005

Iran's foreign policy after 1983 was dominated by external forces, most notably, the efforts of the US to curtail and perhaps topple the regime. However the ''internal threats'' became dominant by the mid 1990s.

The internal threats not just consisted of between the reformist and the conservatives, but as the July 1999 ''student'' demonstrations against the clergy suggested, there were non-clerical forces also aligning with demonstrators, including Kurdish nationalists. Similarly the February(1999) demonstrations by Kurds motivated and encouraged the students of Tehran.

The development of an Iraqi Kurdisn Nationalism would have greater impact on Iran, at least in the long term, than Turkey. It would also fulfill one of the US's objectives of shifting the challenge of Kurdish nationalism more against Iran than Turkey. The constraints on Iran's geopolitic policies are sufficiently limited so that positive developments in Iraq Kurdistan would strongly influence the situation in Iran.

As proved by the last incidents in last couple of weeks, Iran's policies will likely to suppress the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran and to cooperate with Turkey to maintain the two countries' respective spheres of influence northern Iraq most likely through shia groups or even through Ibrahim Caferi, who is the current Prime Minister of Iraq.

Given the last elections that Iranians gave more credit to the conservatives more than any body would expect, Washington might be more willing to gamble on freedom and democracy within Iran by any means. Nobody should argue on the fact that Iran Kurdistan might be the leading component of the new game plan bringing democracy to Iran and to the region.