KurdistanObserver.com

The Kurdish issue changed; we're still living in the past (1)

August 3, 2005

The Turkish daily News

Most of us don’t know it, but the Kurdish issue has changed entirely and the process has entered a much more dangerous phase. We still think things are the way they were back in the 1980s and 1990s. Let’s acknowledge the new movement and behave accordingly.

By: Mehmet Ali BIRAND

  Turkey faces a brand new “Kurdish issue.” What we went through in the 1980s and 1990s are now things of the past. At that time the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) proved itself by waging an extremely violent uprising and engaging in terrorism. They killed some and threatened others. It both terrified and instilled a “Kurdish” identity among our citizens of Kurdish origin. It gave courage to those who were too frightened to say, “I am a Kurd.” It brought ethnic identity to the foreground. It made Kurdish nationalism become accepted.

  Another of its goals was to cause a public uprising and if possible create “safe havens”; however, they failed in this regard. It became obvious that terrorism would not lead to anything. The PKK failed.

  When we look at the present day, we face a different set of facts. Today's state of affairs is much more serious than was the case back in the 19980s or 1990s. It is easy to fight a movement that resorts solely to terrorism. The stronger side wins. Consequently, the Turkish Armed Services (TSK) won the war.

  However, the current state of the Kurdish issue is very different.

  Today, we don't face the “mountain Turks.”

  Neither do we face a PKK that concentrates only on killing people.

  What we face today is a huge group of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin who have discovered their Kurdish identity and are not frightened to openly admit it. They demand their rights and, when necessary, are willing to rally on the streets to get what they want. They utilize their democratic rights to elect those they believe should represent them.

  This group's influence has increased compared what it was in the past. The state, which used to ignore this group, has now started to take their concerns into account before formulating policy.

  For example, why do you think PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's capital punishment was at first postponed. Don't we remember the Kurdish influence during the parliamentary vote on the war in Iraq? Was the ban on Kurdish broadcasting and education lifted just to placate the European Union?

  No. No. No.

  There are millions of Kurds with considerable influence, and their power is increasing every day. No matter what we think, a majority of this huge group still doesn't see the PKK as a terrorist group. They see the PKK as an armed opposition group and Öcalan as a leader.

Kurdish issue outside is bigger:

  Up to this point, I have tried to give you a picture of how things stood domestically and how much the Kurdish problem has changed since the 1980s and 1990s.

  There is also a Kurdish problem on the outside.

  We are face-to-face with a “Kurdish problem” that has changed radically since the 1980s.

  In the 1980s and 1990s, northern Iraq was like Turkey's back yard. At first, we were able to cross the border, under an agreement with Saddam, to pursue the PKK. After the first Gulf war we could do almost anything we wanted in the region. Turkey could also even use Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, who were at each other's throats most of the time, to strike at the PKK.

  Let's now have a look at today.

  There is a Kurdish state that is getting richer every day in northern Iraq and is waiting for the U.S. nod to declare its independence. Barzani and Talabani are now united because their interests coincide. More importantly, Barzani and Talabani no longer see the PKK as the enemy within. Turkish and Iraqi Kurds are in a strange sort of cooperation. Their interests no longer clash. Just the opposite. There is growing consensus on common policies.

As “Kurdish sovereignty” in northern Iraq gets stronger, the expectations of Kurdish groups in Turkey increase. Even though they don't yet seek independence or autonomy, a possible federative structure is being debated more and more. They are planning to have a bigger say in what goes on in their region. In summary, they desire the broadening of their political rights.

How to we see it?

  As you can see, we are face-to-face with a multifaceted Kurdish problem that is totally different from the one we had in the past. In the '80s and '90s we were able to resolve the issue with arms. Today the situation -- both internationally and domestically -- is very different.

  So are we aware of this change?

  Do the prime minister and the security forces have a new policy in mind?

  If they do, what is it?

  If not, where are we headed?

  I will continue with this tomorrow.