Kurdistan Observer

Interview With Kani Xulam by an American student who would like to remain anonymous

April 14, 2008

1) If you could just give a brief history of yourself and job title, what qualifies you to speak on the subject of Turkish Kurds?

My name is Kani Xulam. I am the director of a Washington based non-profit organization, the American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN). I speak for the Kurds partly because I was born a Kurd and partly because I don’t shrink from the battles that life has thrown my way. My parents, my sex, and my nationality were given to me at birth. It happens that it is a liability to be a Kurd in the Middle East at this time. I have chosen to right this wrong and speak for myself as well as other Kurds. Oh, and I am very thankful to the children of Jefferson for affording me this opportunity to do so here in the United States.

2) How has the invasion of Iraq by US and coalition forces affected the opinions of individual Turkish Kurds or Turkish Kurdish groups towards nationalistic goals, with the eventual aspiration of a Kurdish state or some sort of transnational Kurdish Union?

It is often said that the Middle East was shaken up by three major events in the 20th century. The region was carved up by the winners of the First World War; the state of Israel was sanctioned by the United Nations; and Ayatollah Khomeini brought into existence an Islamic theocracy in Iran. The 21st century will have its own trials and tribulations. But its first seminal event has already come to pass: the United States has lodged itself in Iraq. When the British and the French did so at the dawn of last century, in the greater Middle East that is to say, the Arabs became the beneficiaries of their intervention. This time around, it will be us, the Kurds.

While this will be the case as the events of the century unfold, there are serious differences among the Kurds who have been forced to submit to the yoke of different governments. There is no question that the Iraqi Kurds are the real winners of the Bush’s war in Iraq. They gained their virtual independence without the need for a bloody revolution. But in Turkey, the oppression of the Kurds goes on unabated. The Turkish government continues to molest the Kurds the way a pedophile engages in his sick fantasies. But this near-liberation of five million Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan has had a tonic effect on all the Kurds and especially the Turkish ones. A revolution of rising expectations has taken place in the hearts and minds of the Kurds to paraphrase the late Prime Minister Nehru of India. The world will soon wake up with the liberation of another nation called Kurdistan. On that day, love will triumph over hatred. We will add our own saga to the glorious stories of emancipation. A hint for Americans: we will make Thomas Jefferson proud. But America’s inadvertent, unfortunately, role will not be insignificant.

3) Are there any tangible manifestations of a common national identity? Is there a sense that now that Iraqi Kurds have autonomy, they should lobby on behalf of their kin to the north to achieve the same end?

Common national identity doesn’t come into existence overnight especially in societies that were ruled by the likes of Saddam Hussein, Kemal Ataturk, Ayatollah Khomeini, and Hafez al-Assad. When Garibaldi and Cavour helped liberate Italy, the northern Italians and southern ones didn’t have much in common. The people of Tuscany, the most politicized part of the country, led the way for a common Italian identity. The same, I think, is happening in Iraqi-Kurdistan. Southern Kurds are taking the lead in bringing into existence the institutions of a modern state. Kurdish universities, though no match to Oxford or Cambridge, are training the future civil servants. Kurdish television is bringing an unfiltered world to the Kurds and broadcasting another one, of the Kurds, although a tad filtered, to the world. Internet, my favorite communication tool, an invention that future historians will, I have no doubts about it, compare to Guttenberg’s printing press, has enabled the Kurds and Kurdistan to converse with the world that was unthinkable a generation ago. Science is the wind in our sails. Education is directing our path into the future. Knowledge is activating and uniting the Kurds. No Iraqi-Kurd that I know of anywhere in Kurdistan or abroad wants to live in pre-2003 or pre-1991 southern Kurdistan. Honesty compels me to note that we didn’t bring about this state of affairs on our own; we are simply the biggest accidental beneficiaries of the events that have, for a change, conspired in our favor. And we are doing everything we can not to lose our gains. And we are doing more to rid ourselves of our masters.

4) Has the establishment of the KRG strengthened or weakened the shared bond of nationality between Turkish and Iraqi Kurds? Has the KRG ever acted against the interests of Turkish Kurds?

KRG doesn’t need to “represent” the Turkish Kurds. The fact that it exists, the fact that its head is hosted at the White House, the fact that it has official representatives all over the world, the fact that it has an army that may not be a match to the armies of the neighboring countries, not yet, but still an army that is capable of giving them a pause, and a serious one at that, is enough to make all Kurds proud even though, the proudest moment, the independence of Kurdistan, is not yet within our reach.

But an advocate like me needs to also pay heed to the statements that emanate, sometimes, from the representatives of the Kurdistan Regional Government. These shameful attempts to placate the Turks by calling the armed struggle of the Turkish-Kurds out of touch with reality, for example, reminds one the never-ceasing rightful struggle of the southern Kurds against Saddam Hussein. No Turkish Kurd that I know of ever called that noble struggle wrong even if they criticized it as “primitive” and “tribal” sometimes. Saddam was bent on silencing the Kurds and the southern Kurds had every right to fight him, if need be, to the death. The Turkish-Kurds are fighting the same oppression whose perpetrators happen to be different. All Kurds in Iraqi-Kurdistan know that. The few who try to please the Turks are exceptions rather than the rule. When the Turkish power is curbed, and it will be curbed one day, the Iraqi Kurds will be the first to celebrate the event and say, with uncharacteristic bravado, the time to bury that evil system in Ankara was yesterday not today. Such are the vagaries of the international relations. This Kurd does not condone those statements of Iraqi-Kurds; he equates them with the empty platitudes that were offered to Saddam Hussein.

5) Has the 2003 invasion affected the relationship of Turkish Kurds towards the government in Ankara in gaining civil rights?

The talking heads in Ankara will deny that there is a direct correlation between what happened in Iraq and the ever rising Kurdish demand for greater rights in Turkish-Kurdistan. Truth be told, the Turks have a complex that nothing good could come from their south or east or north for that matter. But this time around they are in for a surprise and a bitter one at that. The Kurds in Iraq are thousand times happier than the Kurds in Turkey. The unhappiness of the Kurds in Turkey is pushing Ankara to come to terms with its pledge to be a member of the European Union. It is no wonder that the Kurds of Turkey are the most vociferous champions of Ankara’s desire to join Europe. It is also no wonder that its most fiery opponents are the Turkish nationalists. These Turks don’t want to let go of their supremacy over the Kurds; we are, on the other hand, struggling for permanent equality with them. But the ground is shifting under the feet of these bigoted Turks. Iraqi Kurdistan is proving to be more democratic, in some areas, than Turkey itself. And EU is insisting that Turkey come to its senses, stop molesting its Kurdish populations. In other words, the pressure is not direct, but indirect and smart Turks know that the end of their racist rule will come to pass the way Apartheid did in South Africa or totalitarianism did to their north.

6) Has the development and status of the KRG perhaps served as a model for Turkish Kurds in aspiring for a similar federated or autonomous status with the Turkish central government enjoyed by the KRG to Baghdad?

People worship rising suns not the setting ones goes a Roman proverb. The federal system that is taking place in Iraq has been a blessing for the Iraqi-Kurds. The Turkish Kurds see that, envy the lot of their cousins, and have gone on record for wanting the same.

But in the history of humanity no two experiments have ever been the same. The dynamics that are at play or were at play for Iraqi Kurdistan are absent in Turkish Kurdistan. Oil is what brought America to Iraq. Not much of it exists in Turkish Kurdistan. But what is different about Turkish Kurdistan is that its population has forever severed its links, mentally that is, with the Turks and Turkey. Too many Kurds have died many more have been tortured for Kurds to accept the Turks as their masters. This inconvenient and lopsided marriage will eventually lead to divorce. Domination doesn’t lead to subjugation; it leads to resistance and rebellion. The farsighted citizens of Turkey, and I have in mind the Turkish and Kurdish leaders here, are at a crossroads: one road beckons them the Yugoslav model; the other, my preference, the Czech one. Blood and strife were the outcome of the first; peace and equality are the rewards of the second.

7) Have the recent military incursions by the Turkish Army into Iraqi Kurdistan affected the relationships between Turkish and Iraqi Kurds or between the Turkish Kurds and Ankara?

The recent military incursions, if anything, have thought the Kurds an invaluable lesson on many levels. Notwithstanding the statements of the representatives of KRG, neither the Kurds of Turkey nor those of Iraq recognize the European sanctioned borders that have separated cousins across artificial lines. Yes, access to the Turkish-Kurdish rebels in Iraqi-Kurdistan has been curtailed. Yes, there is a greater scrutiny about their whereabouts in larger Kurdish cities. But there is an understanding as well that the Turks, this time around, were used not to crush the Kurds of Turkey, but to rein in the Kurds of Iraq. Machiavelli could not have planned it better. The Kurds of Iraq were consolidating their power with every passing day. The Arab majority, especially the Sunnis, were alarmed about its prospects. Uncle Sam needed their cooperation as much as it needs the cooperation of the Kurds. It decided to punish the “pesky” Iraqi-Kurds with the Turks whose idea of happiness is how soon and often they could molest the Kurds. Yes, the chattering classes spoke and noted that there was a rift between the Turkish Kurds and Iraqi Kurds. It was not so. More felt solidarity with one another. More will do so in the future. There is a gulf between what the chattering class says and what the people feel. The latter should not be taken for granted.

8) How has the 2003 invasion of Iraq affected the PKK, both ideologically and militarily? Has the invasion affected Turkish Kurd support?

PKK is still in a state of shock. It entered that phase with the arrest of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. It was reduced to a state of passivity with the orders of its imprisoned chief, at least this activist believes, on the orders of his Turkish handlers. But it was not enough to move the Turks to grant the Kurds a semblance of equality. Only the strong are capable of displaying such magnanimity. The Turks are weak and are very afraid of the Kurds.

As to the invasion itself, the Turkish Kurds, predominantly leftists, like many liberals all over the world, initially opposed the occupation of Iraq. But then they saw the gains of their cousins in the post-Saddam Iraq. They are all for a federal solution in Turkey as well. But it looks like a lot of soul-searching is going on and a serious fight between the subject Kurds and the master Turks may still be a matter of time.

8) As a whole, have Turkish Kurds been supportive of the KRG?

The Turkish Kurds are not in a position to support the KRG. The latter has money, connections, and freedom that the Turkish Kurds envy. They are preoccupied with Turkish Kurdistan and, to certain extend, Iranian Kurdistan. Although they pay lip-service to the boundaries that divide Kurdistan, they travel from one to the other the way a Californian drives up and down in the golden state. Ultimately, they think they should be the rulers of all of Kurdistan, but for now, they believe their services are needed elsewhere and Iraqi-Kurds can take care of their own.

10) What is the PKK's opinion of the establishment of the KRG?

Ideally, if the international community were capable of respecting and accepting the wishes of the Kurds, the PKK would have not shied away from competing with KDP and PUK, the partners in the KRG, for the first place among the Kurds, as a political party, throughout Kurdistan. The reality of today is that we have an intolerant Middle East when it comes to the Kurds. They would rather crush us than accept us as their equals. The Kurds themselves can not afford to be intolerant of each other. Some are. They are wrong. They serve the enemies of the Kurds and Kurdistan. They need to be exposed, condemned and reduced to the irrelevancies in the sight of the Kurds as well as history.

11) Has the KRG espoused willingness to cooperate with Turkey in rooting out PKK fighters from northern Iraq affected Turkish Kurd opinion of or relationship with the KRG in Iraq?

The Iraqi Kurds are incapable of rooting out the PKK from their region. At best, they can make life difficult for them. But the greater sentiment among the southern Kurds is for an amicable relationship with them. There is a realization that the shedding of the Kurdish blood, with the Kurdish hands, it is called birakuji in Kurdish, is theatre especially for bloodthirsty generals in Ankara and some Kissinger wannabes in Washington. This generation of the Kurds doesn’t want to take part in such a blasphemous game of realpolitik. If it were possible to hear the common sentiment among the Iraqi-Kurds about the Americans and their attack dogs, the Turks, it would be: if you want help, do so; if you are here to do mischief, please leave.

12) What was the relationship of Barzani and Talabani with the PKK prior to the invasion? with Ankara?

Barzani and Talabani are Kurdish leaders. PKK is a Kurdish party. When Abdullah Ocalan was in Lebanon, Mr. Talabani used to meet with him often and at one time took part in one of his press conferences. I don’t know of a meeting between Mr. Barzani and Mr. Ocalan. But I know that their peoples talk to one another.

The Iraqi Kurdish leaders used to be persona non grata in Ankara. When Mustapha Barzani, the father of Mesud Barzani, fled Arab forces into Turkey, he was chased into Iran. But when the Turkish Kurds became a serious threat to Turkey, the Turkish leaders “discovered” Barzani and Talabani. But in that discovery, there was no affection. They wanted to use the Kurdish leaders to undermine the Turkish Kurds. If the Iraqi Kurds were situated in Afghanistan, the Turkish leaders would never have bothered to talk to them. Or if they ever succeed in their apocalyptic design to wipe out the Kurds of Turkey, the way they wiped out the Armenians, the Iraqi Kurdish leaders will be forgotten as quickly again. With the Turks, you only speak in the language of power; or you get the international community to join you in isolating them as a font of evil. There is no other way to outmaneuver the children of Ataturk.