KurdistanObserver.com
US-Kurdish Relations in Post-Invasion Iraq
Aram Rafaat
Global Politician
Dec 27, 2007
The Kurds' desire to secure and consolidate the freedoms they
enjoyed in the decade prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq has reshaped
U.S.-Kurdish relations in many ways. In order to keep Iraq united with a strong
central government, U.S. policy tries to ensure that the Kurds do not seek
independence. At the same time, though, The United States has tried to work with
the Kurdish Regional Government. The Kurds have equally tried to support the
U.S. presence in Iraq as they too benefit from the cooperative relationship.
INTRODUCTION
This article examines the U.S.-Kurdish relationship in the period after the U.S.
invasion of Iraq. It includes America's pre-invasion plans and assessments and
then evaluates the level of success after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the
difficulties involved, and the changes made in the strategy of both sides.
A major Kurdish priority in post-invasion Iraq has been to secure and
consolidate semi-independent status for themselves. In contrast, U.S. policy
puts the emphasis on ensuring Iraq's sovereignty and on having a strong central
government. This situation potentially puts the two sides in contradictory
positions.
The initial phase reflected America's misreading of Iraqi realities amid
excessive optimism. It arose, as one American author put it, from "their belief
that most people in the world are post-ethnic individualists as Americans
believe themselves to be."
Prior to the invasion, Paul Wolfowitz described Iraqis as among the most
educated and secular people in the Arab world. Similarly, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld overlooked the deep-seated factionalism, describing the Iraqi
problem as that of an "Eastern European country" in which "a repressive dictator
has been taking money for palaces and weapons and not putting it into
infrastructure." Therefore, Wolfowitz suggested, if the United States were to
remove Saddam's regime, Iraqi appreciation and cooperation would be "much
greater than that of Eastern Europe," where people had complained "that it took
the United States so long to get there."
This misplaced optimism dominated their official policies and statements during
the first year of the invasion. Immediately after the fall of Baghdad in April
2003, the United States--under Jay Garner, who led the Office of Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)--depicted itself as a liberator with a
limited and humanitarian role. Then, in May of that year, President George W.
Bush declared the end of hostilities. This was followed by Rumsfeld's
declaration of the step-by-step plan for decreasing U.S. forces in Iraq to
30,000 troops by September 2003.
Later, Bush went further, declaring "Iraq as a democracy will have great power
to inspire the Middle East." Thus, the initial phase of U.S. policy in Iraq was
positive in outlook and expressed the hope for a bright future for the nation.
U.S. plans for that period were based on their belief that Iraqi unity would
emerge following the dictator's demise. Yet the semi-autonomous status of
Kurdistan and the Kurds' desire for separation were perceived to be obstacles
that should be removed. Consequently, the United States sought to end this
semi-state situation and to ensure the full integration of the north into the
new Iraq.
THE U.S. STRATEGY
To overcome this obstacle, many measures were unsuccessfully attempted,
including abolishing or at least weakening the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) and the Kurdish Peshmerga in order to implement a provincial
administrative system. According to the original U.S. plan, the Turks were to
have a major role in the war and in determining Iraq's future. Reportedly,
Turkey wanted to send a large military force to establish a security arc that
might permit them to enter predominantly Kurdish cities. The claim has been made
that the Turks wanted the Peshmerga disarmed, displaced Kurds forbidden from
returning to Kirkuk, and an end to the quest for autonomy. Some writers have
claimed that the United States accepted these demands.
Prior to the invasion, U.S. policy had little interest in encouraging any sort
of federalism. Moreover, to show American support for a united Iraq and to win
Turkish support, the Kurds were not brought into the coalition until three weeks
before the attack.
However, in the post-invasion period, the Americans intended to introduce, in
Wolfowitz's words, "a degree of federalism to ensure that Iraq remains a single
country." This vision was applied in the November 2003 agreement between the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). The
agreement abandoned proposals for ethnic and geographical autonomy in favor of
an 18-province federal system.
The strategy was clearly reflected in official U.S. statements. In addition, as
Jalal Talabani and Masud Barzani explained: "It was rare for the U.S. government
or the CPA to refer to Kurdistan or the Kurdish people." Further, Masud Barzani
explained that the head of the CPA, L. Paul Bremer, wanted "to eliminate all
references to the KRG from the interim constitution." It is noteworthy, too,
that the United States avoided opening a consulate in Kurdistan.
To reduce the Kurdish pro-federal influence in Baghdad, Kurds were excluded from
senior positions in the new government. For example, in a letter to Bush, the
Kurdish leaders Talabani and Barzani complained that "your special
representative had advised us that a Kurd could be neither prime minister nor
president of Iraq." Another method to weaken and diminish the KRG was imposing
economic constraints on the region. For example, the coalition reportedly
"seized oil-for-food revenue specifically earmarked for Kurdistan" and
terminated the "Kurdish currency."
In addition, the United States sought to disarm the Peshmerga. This plan was
achieved by classifying the Peshmerga as militias. However, to avoid appearing
as though they were interfering in such matters, the United States arranged for
the Iraqi administration to appear to be the ones making the decision. It could
also be argued that the transitional constitution, however, did grant many
rights to the Kurds, such as the recognition of the Kurdistan Regional
Government, the formation of a federal system for Iraq on the basis of
geographic and historic realities, the Kurds' right to veto, and a proposal for
a solution to the issue of Kirkuk. However, the Law of Administration for the
State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL) granted little authority to the
KRG by giving the central government "exclusive rights" on a wide range of
sensitive issues, such as a central monopoly on military force, control over
natural resources, broad fiscal powers, and control of the judiciary.
By granting both military power and oil revenue to the central government, the
proposed system had the potential to lead to recentralization and even a return
to autocracy. As Gary Sick notes, central control over revenue could provide the
basis for the emergence of another dictatorship since it "frees the government
from dependence on the popular will, and thereby tends to discourage democratic
behavior and accountability." Moreover, without independent sources of revenue,
the provincial governments would remain dependent on the central government for
funding. The Kurds were under pressure by Bremer to make concessions.[27] In
November 2003, an agreement between Bremer and Talabani was reached to base
Iraq's future structure on the country's 18 existing governorates.
However, any strategy of pressuring the Kurds was restrained by the U.S. need
for Kurdish support. Concern over the growing strength of potentially
pro-Iranian Shi'a parties led the United States to seek out a counterforce in a
strengthened federalist structure. The Kurds also had other assets in this
maneuvering. The United States' relative isolation in its Iraq policy--facing
hostility from many Sunni and some Shi'a Iraqis, Iran, a number of Arab states,
and a significant part of Europe--and the onset of an insurgency made Kurdish
support, and the power of about 70,000 pro-coalition Peshmerga, more valuable.
The relative stability of the north was one of the few advantages for the United
States. Only a token force of U.S. troops was stationed in the Kurdish area.
Although the Kurds never threatened the Americans militarily, they could have
raised the possibility of boycotting the central government and elections,
barring representatives of the central government from Kurdistan, and even
seceding from Iraq. Civil disobedience was also a possibility,] as was
organizing a separate referendum in Kurdistan.
The United States also had some important leverage of its own in preventing any
disagreements with the Kurds from escalating. One of them was the "Turkish
card." The United States recognized Turkish concerns, invited Turkey to
participate in the U.S.-led coalition, and remained silent about the Turkish
threat of cross-border operations. In April 2003, for example, the United States
pushed Peshmerga forces from Kirkuk--which they had entered as part of the
coalition forces--due to Turkish concerns. Secretary of State Colin Powell then
allowed Turkey to send military observers to Kirkuk in order to witness the
replacement of Kurdish troops by American Special Forces.
Thus, the United States simultaneously appeased its old ally, Turkey, by
reducing the Kurdish influence on Kirkuk; secured authority over the city's fate
(a U.S. consulate was opened there but not elsewhere in the north); and adroitly
managed to maintain its relations with the Kurds. To succeed, however, U.S.
policy also had to limit Turkish influence in the north. In July 2003, U.S.
forces apprehended 11 Turkish elite troops who were allegedly preparing to
assassinate the Kurdish mayor/governor of Kirkuk and destabilize the de facto
Kurdish government.
In part to make up for this friction with Turkey but also due to the need for
increased support for coalition efforts, in September 2003, the United States
stepped up attempts to obtain Turkish participation in the coalition. On October
8, 2003, the Turkish parliament accepted a U.S. invitation to send 10,000 troops
to Baghdad. This idea, however, was rejected by Iraq's own government.
During 2004, Turkey exercised pressure to limit the federalism of the future
Iraqi state and the degree of autonomy given to any Kurdish federalist region,
threatening a difficult and bloody future for any such system. When in October
2004 the Kurds mounted pressure on the United States and Iraq to implement
Article 58 of the TAL, which related to Kirkuk, Turkey spoke of possibly sending
troops into northern Iraq, warning that its forces could reach Kirkuk within 18
hours.
The frequent alterations of U.S. policy reflected the complex, changeable nature
of the political and religious opposition to the United States in Iraq. This was
evidenced by the fact that while most Sunnis rejected participation in elections
and in the political process, Shi'a clerics and 42 Shi'a parties called for
general elections in June 2003. Supporting this demand, in January 2004, tens of
thousands of protesters marched. On the one hand, the Sunni's rejection, based
on their demand for restoring a regime they had dominated, undermined the
legitimacy of the whole political process and further reduced security. On the
other hand, the Shi'a demand for what was in effect a Shi'a Islamist state--at
least in the south--threatened to bring to power anti-American religious groups.
In this context, the Kurds' behavior and their interests were likely a welcome
relief.
Thus, the initial phase of a U.S. policy seeking to impose a secular Iraq on the
Shi'a and a strong central government on the Kurds jeopardized its own
interests. In comparison, many Kurds might have preferred an independent Kurdish
state, especially if their situation in a future Iraq looked grim. They thus had
to be offered a good deal in order to back a united Iraq and to continue to use
their efforts in ways that helped the coalition.
THE ELECTIONS AND CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY
The combination of U.S. policy failures, the January 2005 election results, and
relative Kurdish moderation brought a turning point in bilateral relations
between the parties. Of special concern was the poor performance of secular
Sunnis and Shi'a in the election. Kamil Pachachi, a U.S. favorite, failed to win
a single seat; Ghazi Yawer won only five out of 275; and the secular Shi'a Ayad
Allawi mustered only 14 percent of the vote. By contrast, the pro-Iranian Shi'a
religious bloc, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), won more than half the seats.
Therefore, the balance between the secular and religious forces was
significantly altered in favor of the latter. The elections further consolidated
sectarianism and widened the rift between the religious sects. U.S. hopes for a
secular, united Iraq under a central national administration were hard-hit.
By contrast, the new balance created a climate favorable to further
decentralization, benefiting the Kurds; this was clearly reflected in the
permanent constitution. Furthermore, since Kurds comprised the second-largest
bloc in parliament and the biggest secular group, U.S. interest in the Kurds
increased to an unprecedented level. The Kurds became indispensable to the
Americans. They replaced the defeated Shi'a moderates in defending secularism in
Iraq, became a check and a balance between Sunnis and Shi'a, acted as an
arbitrator between them, and encouraged reconciliation.
Finally, the high number of coalition casualties in the period both before and
after the election created an increasingly disturbing and dangerous situation
for the United States. This compelled the United States to reduce the triumphal
tenor of its reports and adopt defensive strategies. The transfer of power back
to the Iraqis became a welcome alternative with a twofold benefit for the Kurds.
First, as partners in powersharing, the Kurds found this new arrangement could
work to their advantage. Second, with a quarter of the parliamentary seats, they
held the balance of power, since a two-thirds' majority was needed in order to
rule. The willingness of the Americans to support the Kurds depended on the U.S.
position in Iraq.
Within this new context, the Americans conceded on a number of issues that had
been rejected during the earlier phase. These included Talabani's election as
president (a reversal of U.S. policy); federalism with a weaker central
government; a clearer resolution for Kirkuk; and recognition of the Peshmerga as
the guards of Kurdistan.
Once marginalized by American administrators, the Kurds were now courted for
their support. U.S. officials began visiting Kurdistan. For example, in May 2005
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made Kurdistan the first stop of her first
visit to Iraq. As Michael Rubin notes, "By going first to Barzani's headquarters
rather than to Baghdad, she bolstered the Kurdish leader's position in the eyes
of his constituents and among the other Iraqi political leaders negotiating in
the nation's capital." Then, in November 2005, Masud Barzani was officially
received in the White House as president of the KRG and was assured the United
States would accord the Kurds "special status" in Iraq. Therefore, it can be
seen that the initial U.S. strategy, which sought to weaken the Kurds and
overcome their separatism, was replaced by another policy based on supporting
the Kurdish position in Baghdad, weakening the pro-Iranian Islamists, and
avoiding the menace of civil war.
This series of developments suggests that the pro-Kurdish element in U.S. policy
was not inevitable, but rather arose from failures and disappointments with
other forces. The Shi'a strategy also pushed, albeit unintentionally, toward
this result. The competition for power with the Sunnis, the fear of civil war,
increasing Iranian influence, and the weakening of secularism all made the Kurds
seem more attractive allies for the United States.
In addition, some influential Shi'a parties called for a special Shi'a region
comprising nine provinces in the south. This attitude greatly strengthened the
case for doing something similar in the north. The Shi'a were also willing to
trade a relatively more secularist Iraq in exchange for Kurdish backing, a deal
that also made Kurdish and U.S. interests run parallel and gave America another
reason to appreciate the value of Kurdish leverage within the new Iraq.
Along similar lines, Iran's policy gave advantages to the Kurds as well. With
growing Shi'a-Iranian links and the radicalization of Iran's government--under
Mahmud Ahmadinejad and the drive for nuclear weapons--U.S. policy wanted
stronger forces in Iraq that were not so tied to Tehran.
The emergence of the Sadr faction among the Shi'a intensified this situation. In
the December 2005 elections, the Sadrists emerged as the strongest partner
inside the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), with a bloc of 32 seats. Also under
Muqtada al-Sadr's control was the Mehdi army, which doubled in size between 2004
and 2006. Sadr sent two strong messages to the Americans: One demanded a
timetable for U.S. withdrawal, and the other was his willingness to defend Iran
if it were attacked by the United States.
During the first stage, the response was to try to use the Kurdish card to
overcome the problems posed by both the Shi'a and by the Shi'a-Sunni conflict.
After the December election, for example, the Americans urged the Kurds to
embrace the Sunnis and remain involved in negotiations in order to help form a
secular government with Sunni Arabs and secular Shi'a under the leadership of
Allawi. As a result, a temporary rival coalition of Kurds, Allawi, and Sunnis
was formed that called on the UIA to withdraw from Jafari.
However, Iran's influence in Iraq is not confined to the Shi'a, and it is
relevant to note that there were instances of cooperation (albeit inconstant)
between Iraqi Kurdistan and Iran before the U.S. occupation or the emergence of
the region of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991. Iran has been, as one analyst put it, a
"longstanding benefactor and player in Iraqi Kurdish politics when the KDP and
PUK administered Kurdistan under the No Fly Zone."
Evidence of the Kurdish desire to gain support from Iran and maintain good
relations with Tehran is the fact that since 1991 (when Iraqi Kurds assumed
control of the region), the KRG has banned incursions into Iran from the armed
camps of the Iranian Kurdistan opposition parties that have been based within
the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan. Moreover, since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, an
economic dimension has been added to the relationship. According to Kurdish
officials, the annual trade between the two is estimated to be about $800
million. There are Iranian consulates in both Arbil (the capital of the
Kurdistan region) and Sulaymani (the second largest city in the KRG). Unlike
other neighboring countries, where the KRG has no formal representation, the KRG
has official representation in Tehran, and this can be construed as recognition
of the KRG by the Iranian government.
In its effort to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq, the United States has sought
to undermine Kurdish-Iranian relations. For example, in January 2007, U.S.
forces, accompanied by military helicopters, stormed the Iranian consulate in
the Kurdish city of Arbil, arresting five Iranian employees. Then, on September
20, 2007, the U.S. army arrested an Iranian trade delegation on suspicion of
smuggling weapons into Iraq for use against U.S. soldiers. This action has
damaged Iranian-Kurdish relations.
As an act of protest against the U.S detention of the Iranian official, Iran
temporarily closed the main border crossing to the KRG. In the words of Hoshyar
Zebari, Iraq's foreign minister, "Iran is punishing the Kurdish region for the
U.S. detention of an Iranian citizen." The closure of the border has had serious
repercussions for the economy of the KRG, causing it to lose millions of dollars
worth of trade each day. Moreover, many Kurds have speculated that Iran lets
Ansar al-Islam operate across the border to project its influence and leverage
in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).
Another significant incident that contributed to a rift between the KRG and Iran
was the shelling by the Iranian army of villages in Iraqi Kurdistan in August
2007, which lasted several weeks. The attack was condemned by Zebari, the KRG,
and the Kurdistan Regional Parliament. The KRG held a special meeting on August
28, 2007, and called on the Iraqi government, the UN, and the U.S.-led coalition
forces to pressure Iran to stop the assault. Iran confirmed the shelling in an
official statement by General Yahya Rahim Safavi.
The U.S. response was paradoxical, for despite U.S. allegations of Iranian
interference in Iraqi affairs, the Bush administration remained silent on the
issue. The arrests of the Iranian "diplomats" in Kurdistan, the Iranian
bombardment, the closing of the border by the Iranian government, U.S. silence
on these events, and the failure of the U.S. occupying forces to take
responsibility for defending the Kurds are evidence of the U.S. strategy to
create a gap between the Kurds and the Iranians.
The differences between the Kurds and the United States also result from their
respective conflicts of interest in the region. On the one hand, the KRG has the
policy of keeping a balance between its relations with both Iran and the United
States. On the other hand, the United States has a strategy of maintaining close
links with its NATO ally, Turkey. However, since there is tension between Iran
and the United States, and Turkey is fiercely hostile to the Kurdish cause, this
is a serious obstacle to U.S.-Kurdish relations.
Another measure that the United States adopted was a policy of
"recentralization." On the one hand, Sunni participation together with the
emergence of the pro-centralist Shi'a constituted powerful forces within the UIA
and gave the United States new hope that a strong central government could be
achieved. This policy was both an acknowledgement of Sunni participation and an
effort to avoid civil war. As then U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad
stressed to the Sunnis, the United States would support efforts to address their
legitimate concerns. Khalilzad also urged the Iraqi leaders to "strike
agreements that will win greater Sunni Arab support." One of the most
significant Sunni demands was for a strong central government. Therefore, in
line with Sunni concerns, Khalilzad explained that his goal was to "start the
process of forming a national unity government." Rice asked for continued
central control, and she urged the security forces to give their allegiance to
the central government.
This new policy also failed to solve the Iraqi dilemma. The U.S. strategy of
seeking the formation of a strong secular central government was replaced by
that of preventing and containing civil war. The prospect of full-scale civil
war between Shi'a and Sunnis was strong in the autumn of 2005. The number of
sectarian casualties during this period reached an alarming level. A significant
step towards sectarian civil war took place when the Shi'a al-Askari shrine in
Samarra was blown up on February 22, 2006.
Within a period of a few days, hundreds of Sunnis were killed, and dozens of
Sunni mosques were damaged in retaliation. Furthermore, Sunni involvement in the
political process and the emergence of the pro-centralist Shi'a as strong forces
in parliament brought contradictory results. Through their entrance into the
political process, parliament, and government institutions, sectarianism was
legalized and institutionalized. Furthermore, instead of securing Iraqi citizens
from the threat of sectarian violence, the security forces and institutions
themselves perpetrated acts of violence; they were part of the problem. Examples
include the secret prison of the Internal Ministry (which detained Sunnis) and
the Shi'a death squads. Furthermore, many Sunni policemen were involved in
killing based on identity.
CONCLUSION
The conflict in Iraq is particularly intransigent because of the convoluted
tangle of competing ethnic, religious, cultural, historical, and political
features of that society. It is a deeply divided nation with a legacy of
internecine and interstate conflicts, factional strife, systematic repression,
social alienation, and ethnic and religious fanaticism. Currently, it is a
post-authoritarian state with little or no experience of electoral democracy.
Iraq's problem is a direct consequence of the accumulated effects of centuries
of internal conflict.
An important contributing element in the internal divisions within Iraq is
ethnic nationalism. For many decades, Kurdish ethnic nationalism has been
expressed in the form of secessionist and irredentist movements, but this has
brought them into conflict with Sunni pan-Arab nationalism and territorialism.
Another key ingredient in the civil conflict has been the clash of identities,
and as Carole O'Leary has noted, many Iraqis "view their own communal identities
in primordial or essentializing terms." For example, there is a lack of feeling
of belonging to Iraq and the absence (or weakness) of a sense of Iraqi national
identity among the Kurds.]
Instead, as O'Leary observes, there is an emerging form of a "Kurdistani-ness"
form of identity. In other words, Iraqi society is dominated by seemingly
irreconcilable groups with opposing notions of their own identity. The Kurdish
identity seems incompatible with an Iraqi national identity; pan-Arabism clashes
with Iraqi nationalist ideals; and Shi'a and Sunni versions of Islam have long
been hostile to each other. Due to the depth of feeling that underpins this
clash of identities, O'Leary classifies Iraq as a "non-nation state." She points
out that "the identity and comparison patterns in a _non-nation state' produce
patterns of political conflict different from those found in nation states." In
fact, for O'Leary "the failure to construct an Iraqi national identity that
includes all Iraqis is a key factor in understanding Iraq's institutionalized
culture of violence, its inability to initiate political reform, and its
aggressiveness toward its neighbours."
Moreover, 80 years of conflict between these contradictions has created
exclusive interests for each group. There is a unique balance between the former
rulers, the Sunnis, and the subjugated Shi'a and Kurds. The Kurds want local
self-rule or even independence. The Sunnis' main interest is to recover their
grip on power while keeping the country's territorial integrity intact. Shi'a
form about 60 percent of Iraq's population, and their main interest has been to
exercise their right as the majority to run the country. Hence, the key
interests of Iraq's ethnic/sectarian groups are diametrically opposed and
seemingly irreconcilable.
These opposite interests have resulted in the creation of exclusive visions for
each group over many things. The role of Islam is one example. Most Shi'a and
Sunnis insist on an Islamic identity for Iraq, but Ibrahim al-Marashi notes that
the Kurds believe that "an Islamicized state will merely attempt to subsume the
Kurdish identity under the banner of Islam." Foreign policy is another area of
disagreement. Though both Shi'a and Sunnis express their hostility to Israel, it
is often reported that the Kurds feel less so and even make agreements with
Israelis. The Shi'a view Iran as a friend and as powerful coreligionists.
Sunnis, on the other hand, consider Iran as an enemy that threatens Iraq's Arab
identity.
These are all real issues and problems, not merely misunderstandings or due to
the personal quirks of individual leaders. No wonder, then, that Iraq is such a
difficult issue to manage. However, the Kurdish focus on self-rule, which opts
out of the struggle for power over the country as a whole, is in this mix the
relatively easiest goal to attain.
