By: Prof Goran Nowicki
Dec 19, 2005

The early results are coming from the parliamentary elections in Iraq and the outcome of this election will shape the composition of the next parliament and the next government. The results will dictate the move that the Kurds make after January.

PRELIMINARY RESULTS

The early results from Baghdad show that the Shiite's Islamist Alliance is going to maintain its present dominance in the next parliament. Based on this result, one expects that the Shiite group obtains 130 seats (+/- 5) in the next parliament. In other words about half of the seats.

The next group in Baghdad following the Shitte lead is the Sunni Iraqi Accord which is expected to obtain 45 seats (+/- 3) in the next parliament. The group which is the closest group to the insurgency will manage to beat the secular Iraqi national list headed by Allawi. Based on the results, the Allawi's group is expected to obtain 28 seats (+/- 3) in the next parliament.

The Baghdad results demonstrate the weakness of the Kurds in getting votes in the capital. The 3 Kurdish lists in the election are expected to gather 62 seats (+/- 3) in the next parliament. The Kurdish leadership has failed to capitalize on the vote of Kurdish Islamists and the Faily Kurds.

The number of Kurdish seats and to a lesser extent, the number of Shiite seats will decrease in the next parliament and the Sunni groups will have a bigger presence in the next parliament.

KURDISH MOVES

The Kurd's weakness in creating a united front before the election will cost them in this election. One hopes that the Kurdish leadership immediately engages in a damage control to bring back the Kurdish groups under one umbrella. The Islamist Kurdish groups have the support of at least 10% of Kurdish population and the percentage of support for them in the rural areas is much bigger. The Islamists have traditionally played the role of judges and peace makers in the Kurdish society and it will be in the best interests of them if they are encouraged to continue such a role in the Kurdish government and do not go towards mixing politics and religion. In the unification of the administration of Kurdistan regional government the judiciary is one source of conflict and that position can be delegated to Islamists to win them back.

Once the Kurds put their house in order, they can engage in negotiation for forming the government in Baghdad. The Kurds have 3 choices:

1- Continue their present coalition government with the Shiites. In that scenario, the Kurds may still retain the ceremonial position of president. But their influence will be decreased during the next 4 years. So far the Shiites have proved that they are not a very trustworthy partner for Kurds. The US will not be happy with this Kurdish choice if there are other alternatives for the Kurds.

2- The other alternative for the Kurds is to form the next government with the remaining groups except the Shiites. In that scenario, the Kurds can bargain for the prime minister position, having the highest number of seats in the collation. But this option will damage their relations with the Shiites. The chances for this alternative are getting weaker (but not impossible) as the Shiites manage to get a bigger number of the seats in the parliament. considering the high number of Shiite seats in the next parliament, this option has the highest possibility of turning into a political deadlock.

3- The third option for the Kurds is independence, or the more extreme position of a Kurdish coup in Baghdad (as I discussed it in my past article). At this stage, a Kurdish coup seems a more obtainable alternative than Kurdish independence considering the regional situation. The possibility of a coup option for Kurds has made both the Shiite and the US administration nervous. Such an option, will be a wild card in the hands of Kurds which will make their moves unpredictable for the players in Iraq. This option also raises the stakes of Kurds so that they are not taken for granted by the other players.

From the 3 moves mentioned, the third one has the highest risk, but the highest gain. The second one has moderate to high gain with uncertain risk of medium to high. While the first option has moderate gain with calculated lower to medium risk. Depending on the degree of risk acceptance of Kurdish leadership, they will choose one of the options.

But the political philosopher Machiavelli would have gone for option 2, arguing for forming coalition with weaker parties and not the stronger party. While John Locke would have chosen option 1. His rival Hobbes may have gone for option 3 with a nod from Machiavelli's prince.