KurdistanObserver.com

 Dec 8, 2005

Turkish Daily News

The so-called Kurdish problem is still one of the foremost topics of conversaation among the movers and shakers in Ankara. It is clear that things are not going well on this front. The developments in northern Iraq, the emergence of Barzani as a prime player, the increase in PKK actions and the provocations in the Semdinli events have all worked to bring a completely new atmosphere to the Kurdish problem in Turkey.

Mehmet Ali Birand

  The so-called Kurdish problem is still one of the foremost topics of conversation among the movers and shakers in Ankara. It is clear that things are not going well on this front. The developments in northern Iraq, the emergence of Barzani as a prime player, the increase in PKK actions and the provocations in the Semdinli events have all worked to bring a completely new atmosphere to the Kurdish problem in Turkey.  The conditions that existed between 1984-1988 have changed. The situation has gone beyond being a simple PKK terror problem. We have come to the point where the problems in the Southeast will not be solved by the food-work formula, in other words, by investment alone. Taking economic and social precautions in the region, along with a few cultural steps for show purposes, will not do the trick.  The "Kurdish problem" has turned into an identity problem and, at the same time, a political problem. Had we taken a few steps in the six months following the cease-fire announced by Ocalan in 1999, we might have gotten ahead of where we are now. But the political leaders in power at the time did not listen to the warnings of the military. They made no moves in terms of policy.

  And now we find ourselves in the position we are in today.

  The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has a gun to our head. The threat of terror has been renewed. They have begun to give signals that they will be able to destroy the stability we worked so hard to create. Ankara is aware of all this. But they have not been able to overcome their internal differences in viewpoint.

No need to fear fear: In recent days -- judging from Democratic Society Party (DTP) leader Ahmet Turk's statements, followed by Ocalan's views as published by Hurriyet and the revelation that National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Undersecretary Emre Taner met with Barzani in northern Iraq, it seems that we are speeding towards a new period. A new policy will be born. Turkey is changing its official stance on the "Kurdish problem," the PKK and Kurdistan in northern Iraq. This is an inescapable fact. If Ankara were to resist or try to prevent this change, sooner or later international conditions and regional conjecture would actually force the change to occur.  Some people will be very angry with me for the views I express below. So please, even if you don't agree with them, at least think about them. If we don't act quickly and turn the situation around so it's in our favor, we will really be too late. And if we are too late, we will wind up turning northern Iraq into a center of gravity for both the "identity" and the "monetary" fronts. And what's more is that we will be doing this with our own hands. We could lose the Southeast if we stay the course.  If we don't want this to be the situation, we need to make some dramatic decisions, break some pre-existing taboos and do all of this even if we don't like to or want to. Whatever happens with the PKK (and this includes the idea of a general amnesty), they must come down from the mountains and we must convince them to lay down their weapons. We have to take brave steps in this direction.  We must support and allow ethnic Kurd politicians to engage in politics and let them enter the Turkish Parliament with their politics. If we draw the Kurds into politics, the prevention of terror will become much easier.

  We must not have an allergy to open displays of Kurdish identity and culture. To the contrary, we must embrace this. We must not push the DTP outside of mainstream politics.

  Instead of seeing northern Iraq and Kurdistan as our enemies, we must open our arms to them, even taking them under our protection.

  The government in Ankara as well as MIT members and some authorities from the military know this already, but have not been brave enough to implement any of it yet. We don't do anything because we are afraid that, in the future, the Kurds will want independence. We believe that if we take these steps I've described above, the Kurds will want more and more and that, in the end, the country will be divided.  Of course it's true that there are some factions that would like to set up an independent government. This will always be on their secret agendas. However, if we take the steps above and embrace Kurdish society, most of them would choose us. And that, in itself, is enough to prevent division.

  Let's not be afraid. Let's trust ourselves. And let's not forget that if we don't take these steps, we might lose Kurdish culture and in so doing fall into much bloodier and more difficult situations. Those who support separation on the Kurdish side wouldn't achieve their goals, but our chance at happiness and peace would also be wiped out.

There are five axes in Ankara: In the search for a new Kurdish policy, it's not only the hand of the government that is involved in motions to come up with a decision. We don't yet know whose argument will be more effective in the coming period. The administration now wants to come to an agreement on a shared view of the matter though it does not wish to shoulder all the political responsibility for it.  The administration: They are aware that a new approach is necessary and, as such, are taking tiny steps. But their steps are not yet big enough to be able to break some of the taboos discussed above.  MIT: In the best position to actually see the truth, it has the best read on both the situation in northern Iraq and the situation in the Southeast. But it doesn't want to be front and center.  Cankaya: The president, while seeing that there are certain fine-tunings that need to take place, is acting with caution.  The military: They have the most rigid stance of all these groups, having lived inside the clashes for years, having suffered the biggest losses in the armed struggle against the PKK, and do not want to take any risks. The public: One section of the media is resisting all changes put forward by opposition and by conservative members of society. But in general the Turkish public feels that something must be done about these matters. What they are awaiting is an answer from Ankara.