The Kurdish Front
By DAVID L. PHILLIPS
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
February 5, 2008
Continued democratization and economic development is the best way for Turkey to
drain the swamp of domestic support for the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). A
comprehensive solution also requires cooperation between Turkey and the Iraqi
Kurdistan Regional Government, from whose territory the PKK operates. Instead,
Turkey has gone for the military option, risking a regional conflagration that
would destabilize Iraq.
After U.S. President George W. Bush agreed on Nov. 5 to provide actionable
intelligence on the PKK to Ankara, Turkey launched a series of air strikes
against targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. Though nearly 30 PKK members were killed in
the first attack in December, subsequent sorties only struck some empty caves
and abandoned settlements, inflicting little damage to the PKK' infrastructure
or capabilities.
The Iraqi Kurdish leadership -- Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Massoud
Barzani, president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government -- has reacted
calmly. They are prepared to put up with an air strike or two if it helps
mollify Turkish hard-liners and prevent a large-scale ground invasion. But their
patience is not without limit. Fear is spreading among Iraqi Kurds, who demand a
tougher response from their leaders. Turkish air strikes also endanger civilians
nearby, and the regional Kurdish government may have to deal with refugees if
the strikes continue.
There is also a growing outcry against the United States among Iraqi Kurds, who
are among Washington's strongest allies in the country. They feel betrayed by
America's complicity in Turkey's attacks. The U.S. sold out the Iraqi Kurds
twice in recent history -- once in 1975 when the CIA ceased support for them,
and then again during the U.S.-Iraq war in 1991, when Washington encouraged the
Kurds to rebel against Saddam Hussein only to abandon them later when the Baath
regime struck back. Iraqi Kurds fear history might be repeating itself.
Knowing that it is in their interest to reduce cross-border violence, Messrs.
Talabani and Barzani recently convinced the PKK to announce a cease-fire and
intervened to secure the release of eight Turkish soldiers held captive by the
PKK.
They have also targeted the PKK's financing and information infrastructure. The
Kurdistan Regional Government stepped up efforts to interdict PKK cash couriers
by bolstering security at local airports. Checkpoints have been established
around PKK bases in Iraq's Qandil Mountains, monitoring the flow of goods and
barring all foreign and local press to stop the PKK from using the media for
propaganda. The government closed all official PKK offices and shuttered other
Iraqi Kurdish groups, like the Democratic Solution Party, that espouse violence
against Turkey.
While the regional government is ready to put pressure on the PKK, it is not
ready to confront them militarily. Mr. Barzani, whose forces joined Turkish
troops in operations against the PKK twice in the 1990s told me that thousands
of his men were "martyred" attacking camps that even Saddam believed were too
well fortified to destroy.
While taking practical steps to contain the PKK, the regional government has
also tried to foster better relations with Ankara. Iraqi Kurds promised Turkey
lucrative business opportunities in the region's oil and gas sector once Iraqi
legislation on production sharing agreements with foreign partners has been
passed. But Turkey has responded with a cold shoulder, rejecting the offer until
the PKK problem has been solved.
Worse, it is threatening economic sanctions against the Kurdistan Regional
Government for harboring the PKK. While slowing trade at the Harbur Gate on the
Turkey-Iraq border, Ankara is also dragging its feet on an agreement to open a
second border crossing to facilitate travel and trade with Iraq. Ankara believes
its economic leverage will pressure Iraqi Kurds to confront the PKK. But
economic sanctions will also hurt Turkish businesses, which have received the
lion's share of reconstruction contracts in Northern Iraq.
Ankara also refuses to have any meaningful diplomatic contact with Iraqi
Kurdistan Regional Government officials. Nor has it responded to the Iraqi
Kurdish proposal for a summit on regional security cooperation among the U.S.,
Iraq, Turkey and the regional government.
With winter immobilizing the PKK in its Qandil stronghold, there is a window of
opportunity for the United States to use its influence over Turkey and the Iraqi
Kurdish leaders to foster trilateral cooperation. Not only is the Kurdistan
Regional Government key to solving the PKK problem. Trilateral cooperation is
critical for the surge in Iraq, where Iraqi Kurdish units fight side by side
with the U.S. military, whose supplies are transported via Turkey.
Instead, the PKK has been able to push the U.S. into the unenviable position of
taking sides between Turkey and Iraq's Kurds. No doubt the PKK welcomes Turkey's
military action because it fuels Kurdish nationalism and undermines moderates
seeking a peaceful solution. And the PKK will surely respond to Turkey's attacks
by striking back.
The escalation of this deadly conflict also plays into the hands of Turkey's
"deep state" -- a web of military and security officials, the bureaucracy, and
corrupt politicians with ties to Mafia types waiting in the wings to reassert
their power and privileges. Seeing themselves as the defenders of secularism,
these forces are deeply distrustful of the Justice and Development Party's
Muslim leadership (AKP), which just moved to lift a ban on wearing head scarves
in public universities and arrested ultranationalists suspected of political
killings. The "deep state" would surely like to use the resurgent PKK as an
excuse to crack down on the AKP, thereby shrinking the space for democratic
participation and radicalizing Turkey's Islamists. This would also reduce
Turkey's chances of joining the European Union.
Instead of giving a green light to further Turkish military actions, the Bush
administration should intensify its diplomacy to achieve a nonmilitary solution
to the PKK problem. The U.S. should encourage the Kurdistan Regional Government
to ratchet up pressure on the PKK. And Washington should urge Turkey to deepen
and accelerate democratic reforms. This needs to be done quickly before a new
round of PKK attacks sabotage prospects for conciliation and cooperation among
the U.S., Turkey and Kurdish leaders in Iraq.
Mr. Phillips is project director of the National Committee on American
Foreign Policy and a visiting scholar at Columbia's Center for the Study of
Human Rights.
