OP/ED pieces are restricted to
columnists who contribute their opinions solely to the Kurdistan Observer
Battling in Many Fronts
Dr: Nazhad Hawramany
Switzerland
Feb 5, 2008
The Kurdish leadership in Iraqi Kurdistan is engaged in a bitter row with the
central Iraqi government on several vital issues concerning Iraqi Kurdistan By
following the turn of events for the last few months, it is obvious that there
is a deterioration of relations between Kurdistan regional government and the
central Iraqi government and despite countless highly publicized politburo
meetings of both dominant parties (KDP and PUK), aimed at an effective strategy
to deal with the central government, i t seems none of those strategies are
working properly, because all high level Kurdish delegations to Baghdad failed
so far to solve those issues and the situation has turned into a stand-off with
the central government and stalemate on several vital issues ( the priorities of
disputed issues are as they were listed according to statements from Kurdish
politicians, My personal assessment will put Kirkuk issue in the first place and
all other issues are only secondary to it!) .
Contentious issues currently disputed
between Iraqi central government and Kurdistan Regional government:
-The share of Kurdistan region from Iraqi budget ( with Kurds insisting on 17%,
and Baghdad insisting on lower percentages of about 13%), Arab politicians in
Baghdad ( Sunnies and Shiites alike, which strangely enough Kurds helped to
unite), have been united in opposing Kurdish demands and accused Kurds of
overreaching. There is no cor rect unmanipulated census in Iraq since 1957 and
its difficult to determine the real percentage of the Kurds in Iraq, which the
Kurds estimate to be between 20-25% of Iraqi population. This is very odd that
Baghdad politicians are objecting to Kurdish estimate of 17%( of course this
does not include Kirkuk and other disputed areas, which are still outside the
jurisdiction of Kurdistan regional government), because a major portion of
wealth in Iraq is coming from natural resources of Iraqi Kurdistan ( Kirkuk oil)
and while Kurds agreed to share this wealth with the rest of Iraq, the Arab
politicians are trying to reduce the Kurdish share on obvious chauvinistic
reasons accusing the Kurds of over demanding, and forgetting that the Iraqi Arab
army destroyed 4500 villages and hamlets in Kurdistan and deprived Kurdistan of
any strategic projects or useful infrastructure in the last few decades, which
makes even this percentage a low one!.
-The Budget of Peshmergas is an other contentious issue with the central
government. The Kurdish leadership insists on financing their Peshmerga troops
through Iraqi defence ministry.
The central government, on the other hand, requests that the financing should be
through the region's budget or that they will be ready to finance only 46 000
Peshmerga troops which should serve as border guards and security forces for
Kurdistan region, the Kurds give figures of about 190 thousands Peshmergas and
insist on financing them through the central government.
-The third and most contentious and volatile issue is the implementation of
article 140 of Iraqi constitution, concerning Kirkuk and other disputed areas.
These areas were victims of ethnic cleansing and Arabization during the reign of
the deposed Dictator Saddam Hussein. The Kurdish political leadership accuses
the central government of foot-dragging on its commitments for the
implementation of the constitutional article, which stipulated a 3 phased
process of normalistaion ( meaning allowing deported Kurds to return, and
encouraging the Arab settlers to go back to central and south Iraq), a census in
Kirkuk, and then a referendum in which the people of Kirkuk and other disputed
areas ( in the governorates of Neineva and Diyala), will decide in the
referendum if they want to join the Kurdistan federal region or remain
controlled directly from Baghdad. This referendum
was scheduled to be held not later than 31st December 2007.
The Iraqi government remained elusive in the run up to the deadline, the Kurdish
leadership insisted on saying to their constituents that there will be no delay
in referendum, But under pressure from Americans there was a way out after a
request by the United Nations envoy in Iraq to delay the referendum for another
6 months, which the Kurdish leaders accepted reluctantly in spite of the dismay
of the Kurdish publ ic.
The Kurdish leadership and its media outlets, blame the Al-Maliki government for
failing to respect its obligations and are adamant that the article 140 is still
legally valid and efforts should be made to meet the new deadline of June 2008.
The Kurdish administration themselves are also to take part of the blame,
because they didn't have a unified strategy about Kirkuk, they failed to woo the
other minorities in Kirkuk like Turkmen and Arabs and they failed to support the
Kurds who decided to go back on their own which could have encouraged more
deportees to go back. The KDP and PUK branches in Kirkuk were and still engaged
in partisan competition in Kirkuk, which derailed them from winning the hearts
and minds of people of Kirkuk.
Through the months leading to the deadline of December 2007, the Kurdish
politicians have always put the issue of Kirkuk in the third rank after the
budget and Peshmerga issues, and instead of concentrating their pressure on
Kirkuk issue, they sidelined Kirkuk issue by engaging in a bitter row with
central government and Iraqi oil ministry over oil exploration rights.
The Kirkuk issue was and remains for the Kurdish public, the Litmus paper test
for the performance, credibility and sincerity of any Kurdish leadership.
The Iraqi parliament refused to acknowledge the extension of article 140 and
referred the issue to the federal high court for its judgment. In a divisive and
meddling action, Turkey has called only the Turkmen representatives in Kirkuk
provincial council to Ankara and encouraged them to unite against the referendum
in Kirkuk and in a rare event the Turkmen deputies of Iraqi Shiite alliance as
well as representatives of the ultranationalist Turkmen front controlled by
Turkey as well as other Turkmen politicians gathered in a dubious meeting in
Baghdad (1-3 February 2008) apparently with the blessing of some chauvinistic
Arab Shiite and Sunni politicians in Baghdad and de clared their objection to
extension or implementation of article 140 of Iraqi constitution.
-Then there is the contentious issues of oil exploration contracts , which the
KRG have signed with some oil companies apparently without the consent of
central Iraqi government. There is a fierce opposition from Iraqi parliament
toward those contracts questioning the authority of the KRG to sign such
contracts without prior discussions with Iraqi oil ministry.
The Kurdish administration insists that the contracts are legal and
constitutional according to Iraqi constitution and they were obliged to take
action to improve investment and development in Kurdistan, especially after the
failure of Iraqi parliament to pass the national oil law, this has prompted
Kurdish parliament to pass its own regional law last year. The nature of those
contracts though, remain obscure, neither the Kurdish parliament, nor the Iraqi
parliament nor the Kurdish public know anything about t he details of those
deals signed. This raises doubts about the real beneficiaries from such
contracts.
To be able to succeed in those disputes with the central government, the Kurdish
leadership needs to make sure that it will definitely win in the most important
battle front in Iraqi Kurdistan itself, the Kurdish public opinion is wary of
the widespread corruption among Kurdish officials, and so far there hasn't been
any serious tangible efforts to tackle this issue which is eroding the Kurdish
society like an aggressive cancer. There is exasperation among the Kurdish
public also about lack of basic services like electricity, drinking water
supplies, lack of public transport services, lack of housing projects, neglect
of younger generations of Kurdistan, dismal record of women's rights and failure
to implement measures to tackle honour killings.
The Kurdish public feels that newly prospered Kurdish politicians and officials
are increasingly secluding them selves in ivory towers and become insensitive to
the daily sufferings of the vulnerable sections of the society.
Another issue which created a lot of resentment among Kurdish public, is the
Iraqi president (himself a Kurd), by refusing to consent the death sentences
imposed on Iraqi officers convicted of Anfal genocide crimes against civilian
Kurds in 1986-1988, simply by
implying that that he is against the death sentence. The Kurdish president
apparently doesn't want to upset Arab Sunnites
and feels sympathetic towards the
unrepentant previous Iraqi defence minister who directly committed Anfal
genocides and was convicted in a fair trial of the Iraqi special tribunal by a
panel of high ranking Iraqi judges headed by an Arab judge,
The president should learn from history and realize howthe
American president and democratic European leaders didn't object to death
sentences for Nazi officers after WWII
Nurmberg Holocaust trials. No one has the right to trivialize the heavy
toll of 182`000 victims Kurdish children, women and men.
How could we expect an international recognition of Anfal and Halabja genocides
, if we Kurds are not serious about punishing the perpetrators of those
genocides.
The real issue remain winning back the support and trust
ofthe Kurdish public in the first place, the Kurdish leadership could
jeopradize the historic support and commitment of ordinary Kurds for their
leadership in their confrontation with the increasingly hostile Iraqi central
government.
