In early December 2006 during
an official trip to Iran Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan denounced a
possible deployment of American troops, and more recently
NATO forces, from central Iraq to the Kurdish north. Erdogan
stated that ‘it would be a flaw since there are no problems in
northern Iraq’.
If Turkey’s main concern is
indeed the PKK in northern Iraqi Kurdistan, then why would Turkey’s Prime
Minister be against an American or NATO presence in the region which could take
action against the Kurdish rebels? This indicates that there is more than just
the PKK. However, Turkey does seem to be
seeking American support to form a Turkish-American military force to
move into Kurdistan instead, allegedly to fight the Kurdish rebels.
Since the fall of Saddam in
2003 Turkey has been expressing concerns about the creation of an independent
Kurdish state as southern neighbor. This would account for a rise in nationalism
among Turkey’s own Kurdish population and hence bring unrest and insurrection
along its way in the country’s predominantly Kurdish southeast. Turkey knows
that Kurdish control over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk would make this idea
feasible. A military intervention into Kurdistan would be an intimidation
towards the Kurds to keep their hands off Kirkuk.
Just like Iran and Syria have
been accused of supporting Iraqi insurgents, recently the spokesman of the Third
Bureau of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
accused Turkey’s intelligence service (MIT) of
conducting terrorist acts in Kirkuk in order to avoid the referendum
of 2007 which is to decide the future status of the city. Turkey fears a Kurdish
majority outcome would result in the annexation of Kirkuk by the Kurdistan
autonomous region.
In the beginning of February
2007 the New Anatolian News Agency
reported that Turkish authorities have decided to wage a limited
attack against the PKK, following analysts’ views which denounced military
Turkish intervention. The New Anatolian was told by these analysts that military
intervention had been considered in two different ways; as part of the first
option Turkish troops would cross the Habur border and penetrate 350 kilometers
deep into Kurdistan, requiring 510.000 troops in an invasion limited in time
(160 weeks), taking into account the Turkish economy.
The second option considered
was again a cross-border operation, in which 200.000 troops would penetrate the
Qandil Mountains by 30-60 kilometers into Kurdish-controlled area. This would
have required two billion American dollars for accomplishment.
In regards of the latter
option Turkey would have contacted Iran to deploy troops to its border with
Kurdistan, so avoiding possible PKK flight routes to Iran.
However both options
lacked American support. According to analysts a military invasion
would be an inappropriate move at the moment whereas a limited attack
produced by air strikes and shell bombardment would
not have an efficient impact on a guerrilla movement like the PKK.
For now keep in mind the part
in the sentence of the analysts in which they clearly refer to ‘at the moment
being’.
The cases of the PKK and
Kurdish control over Kirkuk, which contribute to the tension between Turkey and
the Kurdistan Region, both allies of the US, involve a significant influential
part played by the Americans. The US has disapproved Turkish military action in
Kurdistan and
urged several times the issue of Kirkuk to be resolved by article 140
of the Iraqi constitution. These indicate that the US would oppose a Turkish
invasion.
Several reasons are to
explain this matter: first of all, the US already has a tough and difficult job
of battling insurgents in central and southern Iraq, in a country that is on the
edge of ultimate civil war outbreak. A Turkish invasion in the only peaceful
part of Iraq would therefore be inappropriate to US policy.
Secondly, with a booming
economy and permanent peace and stability, Kurdistan can be seen as the only
positive point in whole of Iraq. War in Kurdistan would deteriorate the only
positive side of the war in Iraq.
Thirdly, major Turkish
intervention in Iraq would encourage Iran and Syria to do the same.
Finally and most importantly,
Turkey and the Kurdistan Region are both US allies and both of strategic
importance to the US. Both sides are crucially needed in their contribution to
the region’s stability. Especially the Kurdish leaders have an important part to
play in the new Iraq, for example the recent
sending of Peshmerga forces to Baghdad. On top of that, retired
Turkish general
Hursit Tolon not long ago told the New Anatolian News Agency that Turkey has
signed a strategic vision document with the U.S. as part of the U.S. aim of
restructuring the Middle East. He added that within the framework of the U.S.’
new Middle East model, their loyal and strategic allies are the Kurds. Securing
Turkey’s and the Kurds’ partnership would give the U.S. the chance to be present
in the Middle East for at least 30 more years.
Now applying the earlier
mentioned ‘at the moment being’ part of the sentence of Turkish analysts in
their denouncement towards a Turkish military intervention, one could claim that
this indicates a Turkish military intervention to take place after an American
withdrawal from Iraq or, as a second option, that it is no more than political
pressure to maintain the relevance of military threats and thus show that Turkey
is prepared to act if necessary.
Now considering the former
possibility, how realistic would a Turkish invasion in Kurdistan be after a US
withdrawal? As mentioned earlier, the case involves more than just the PKK. If
Turkish troops would cross the border into northern Iraq the case would not
remain limited to the PKK anymore but in fact involve the entire Kurdistan
Region. Why? If the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) cannot prove to be able
to oppose a foreign invasion, it would verify its vulnerability and show that it
is not capable of maintaining a federal state, let alone a future independent
state.
A full-scale Turkish
occupation of Kurdistan would not prevail, for several reasons (neglecting
serious damage to the Turkish economy in terms of tourist travel and war
supplies, and pressure from the international community, e.g.
EU negotiations): first of all, a population of 5 million people would
oppose a Turkish presence in the area, backed by its regional government. The
people and the legitimate Kurdish forces would form a resistant force in cities
as well as in the countryside, leaving no safe-havens for a potential Turkish
occupation force nor safe routes for transport of troops and supplies.
Secondly, the weakness of
modern weapons plays a crucial part in the would-be-failure of a Turkish
invasion. How strong and dangerous these weapons may be, they form no means of
battling the enemy hidden among the population and prepared to strike at any
time. Turkey is aware of these phenomena to occur and therefore pledged for a
Turkish-American invasion, coordinated by the US, so hoping to withhold Kurdish
uprising and opposition. After US disagreement with the proposal, Turkey
withdrew its plans for an invasion in Kurdistan for the time being
and seemingly finally came to notice that military action across its borders is
not as easy as it seems.
