Federalism, Not Partition A System Devolving Power to the Regions Is the Route to a Viable Iraq
By Mowaffak al-Rubaie
Friday, January 18, 2008; A19
The Washington Post
BAGHDAD -- Iraq's government is at a stalemate. As in the United States, there
is much discussion here of the need for political reconciliation. What does that
mean? That the majority Shiites and the minority Sunnis and Kurds must find a
way to govern collectively at the national level. As national security adviser
to the head of Iraq's governments since March 2004, I have participated in the
development of democracy in my country. I strongly support the government and
applaud its achievements. But I understand that the political objectives of
Iraq's three main communities are unrealizable within the framework of a
unitary, centralized state.
It has been impossible to maintain a political consensus on many important
issues. For one thing, the U.S.-dominated coalition, which has its own
objectives, must be accommodated. The regional "superpowers" (Iran and Saudi
Arabia) meddle in Iraq's affairs, and their own sectarian tensions are reflected
in the violence here. The absence of truly national political parties and
leadership that reach the Iraqi people exacerbates the problem.
Overall, Shiites see their future based on two fundamental "rights": Power must
be exercised by the political majority through control of governmental
institutions, and institutional sectarian discrimination must be eliminated.
Kurds see their future bound to their "rights" of linguistic, cultural,
financial and resource control within Kurdistan. Sunni Arabs are driven by
resistance to their loss of power, as well as fear of revenge for past wrongs
and the potential for reverse discrimination.
The current political framework is based on a pluralistic democratic vision
that, while admirable, is entirely unsuited to resolving this three-way divide.
It ignores underlying issues and expects that a consensus will emerge simply by
enacting a liberal constitutional legal order.
Pluralistic democracy will not take root unless the national political compact
recognizes and accommodates the fears and aspirations of Iraq's communities.
Resolution can be achieved only through a system that incorporates regional
federalism, with clear, mutually acceptable distributions of power between the
regions and the central government. Such a system is in the interest of all
Iraqis and is necessary if Iraq is to avoid partition or further civil strife.
Only through a new political compact among Iraq's main communities will a viable
state emerge. A key condition for success is that the balance of power should
tip decisively to the regions on all matters that do not compromise the
integrity of the state. The central institutions must earn their legitimacy from
the power that the three main ethnic groups are prepared to give them. Iraq
needs a period during which the Shiites and the Kurds achieve political control
over their destinies while the Sunni Arab community is secure from the feared
tyranny of the majority.
The shape of a reconstructed, federal Iraq could vary, but it should permit the
assignment of nearly all domestic powers to the regions, to be funded out of a
percentage of oil revenue distributed on the basis of population. The federal
government should be responsible only for essential central functions such as
foreign policy (including interregional affairs), defense, fiscal and monetary
policy, and banking. Regional parliaments and executives would govern their
areas. A federal parliament with a new upper house could manage governance at
the national level. A regional political structure would allow for the
development of religious, cultural and educational policies more suited to
areas' populations than a central government could create. A regional framework
for economic policy would also fit better with traditional trade patterns and
markets.
Iraq's political geography suggests five likely federal units: A "Kurdistan
province," including the current Kurdistan and surrounding areas; a "Western
province," including Mosul and the upper Tigris and Euphrates valleys; a "Kufa
province," built around the Middle Euphrates governorates; a "Basra province,"
including the lower Tigris and Euphrates valleys; and a "Baghdad province,"
built around Greater Baghdad, which may include parts of Diyala and Salah ad Din
Governorates. The Kurdish region would be given a special constitutional status
as a recognized society and culture with a unique identity (similar to the
Canadian province of Quebec).
The new, national Iraqi identity will be forged over time as a result of
peaceful, respectful participation in governance and growth, not by fear and
terror as in our past. Iraq's constitution was ratified before its communities
reached agreement on many vital issues, such as provincial powers. Without a
process aimed at reaching a broad political consensus on the makeup of the Iraqi
state, order and democracy are unlikely. This consensus would form the backdrop
to a referendum on a reformed constitution. Each of Iraq's communities has
leaders up to the task of creating a new political consensus. It is time for
them to begin work.
The writer is Iraq's national security adviser. The
views expressed here are his own and do not constitute an official position of
the government of Iraq.
