A Sense of Conspiracy
By Melinda Liu and Larry Kaplow
Newsweek International
July 2-9, 2007 issue - Baghdad was already feeling the heat of an increase in
suicide blasts and roadside bombs, mortar attacks on the Green Zone, and U.S.
pressure to meet its "benchmarks" of progress by September. Amid all this,
rumors abound in Baghdad of coup plots, which Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has
fueled by accusing political rivals—aides say he means former P.M. Ayad Allawi—of
"conspiring" against the government with the help of "foreign intelligence." (Allawi
has denied any connection to a coup plot.) Few in Maliki's government see more
of the internal challenges that the prime minister faces than Foreign Minister
Hoshyar Zebari, a Kurd who has managed to retain his post since being appointed
to the interim government in June 2004. NEWSWEEK's Melinda Liu and Larry Kaplow
spoke to Zebari. Excerpts:
NEWSWEEK:
Washington urgently wants to see progress. What is the tone of communications
between senior U.S. officials and Maliki?
ZEBARI:
The message from
President Bush and the U.S. government is very clear and consistent. They urge
and encourage us to move faster. The whole idea of the surge is really to buy
time [for political progress].
In the U.S. election,
Iraq is the dominant issue. All the Americans we talk to say, "We stand by you
and want to help you to succeed. We've invested a lot of blood and treasure.
There's a lot at stake here. We're not cutting and running, but it's your
government. Some things we cannot do. So you do it."
What do you
think Gen. David Petraeus will say when he reports to Congress in September on
the results of the "surge"?
[He'll say] "I've
achieved most of my goals, but it's not enough. We need serious political
movement, and this is not my job. National reconciliation—it has not happened."
We [in the Iraqi government] had pledged to review de-Baathification measures
and move towards a judicial process. There is progress on the oil law and
another law on revenue sharing. On militias, it is government policy to not
allow militias in the streets. These are all government goals—benchmarks for
which people expect some movement, some sense of motion. There is still some
time. We haven't given up yet.
Can you
describe the relationship between Maliki and Petraeus?
Relations are difficult.
Who's in charge? Who decides? I sympathize because the lines are blurred. The
prime minister cannot just pick up the phone and have Iraqi Army units do what
he says. Maliki needs more leverage.
Do Iraqi
politicians know that American patience is running thin?
I've said over and over
to the Parliament, "You can't act as if this is business as usual. It's not.
People do expect progress."
What about the
prime minister?
He recognizes the
urgency. However, the political ground has shifted recently, making his job more
difficult. The unified Shiite coalition has fragmented. Parliament is not
functioning well.
Maliki speaks
of coup rumors, apparently referring to Allawi without mentioning his name.
There is a sense of
conspiracy. Allawi is moving around [the region]. The prime minister says there
are groups that are out to undermine the government. He also checks with
Washington and London. Always, their response [to us] is, "We are not part of
it. We support you. Yours is the legitimate government." If there were any
dramatic change, it would suspend the political process. What Allawi is hoping
for is not a possibility. It would mean failure for the United States.
What did
Allawi do to make Maliki think he's plotting a coup?
There was a serious
conspiracy before this government was formed, which feeds the government's
imagination—the Six Plus Two Group of intelligence chiefs of Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Jordan, plus the United States
and Britain. Their goal was to keep encouraging Sunnis to participate in the
Iraqi elections, and to contain Iran. They put intelligence capability and
financial muscle [into the effort]. It was not seen as a positive move by the
prime minister, but we dealt with it quietly, without much fuss. After the
election, the Six Plus Two Group continued without Iraqi participation. I
complained, saying, "You're discussing Iraq and we're not present." It created
bad feelings. Shiites and others took this as an anti-Shiite move. Kurds also
felt, "What the hell does Turkey have to do with this? There must be something
fishy."
They would meet every two
or three months. Some [of our] people reported that Allawi met the Six Plus Two
[in May] or that he had a wishy-washy guy, a Kurd who collaborated with the
former government, do it.
By
"wishy-washy guy" you mean Irshad Zebari.
He is my cousin. He was
minister of State under Saddam. Allawi wanted to bring Kurdish faces to show
that his new bloc represents all Iraqis, but [Kurdish leader Masoud] Barzani,
[Iraqi President Jalal] Talabani and Maliki were really upset. It had the
elements of something sinister against the government. Their criticism was a big
blow to Allawi. I suggested the government check with the United States and
Britain to see if they are part of it. They can't have it both ways. They can't
support this government and also work with these people. I don't think
Washington will support Allawi or give him any encouragement.
