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After a meeting of retired Gen. Joseph Ralston, US special envoy on
countering the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) -- a title that the Turkish
press has transformed into “special envoy for counterterrorism” -- held on
Jan. 29 with Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan regional
government, and his vice president, Kosrat Rasul, Turkey has reportedly
been given a green light from the US to attack PKK positions on the Kandil
Mountain.
The same sources
say that the military invasion will start in the beginning of April 2007.
This was critical news that both the Turkish establishment and a part of the
public have long been anticipating.
Will it bring relief as expected? Or will
the operations get rid of the gangrene that is referred to as the “Kurdish
problem”? That remains to be seen. However both the Americans and the
Turkish establishment must be quite relieved to have convinced the Kurdish
leaders of Iraq to give the green light to a Turkish military operation on
Kandil, where the PKK contingency camps are and from which it conducts armed
forays into Turkish soil.
The consent of the Kurdish leadership has
been wrought out by the Americans after a convoluted process lasting nearly
half a year. The American command in Iraq did not want to lose the support
of their only ally in this hostile country. And the Iraqi Kurdish leadership
wanted to keep the PKK in their territory as a trump card against the
belligerent attitude of the Turkish government and military toward the
establishment of an autonomous Kurdish administration. As the prospects of a
civil war and eventual dissolution of Iraq came into sight, the worries of
the Turkish establishment concerning the evolution of Kurdish autonomy into
a fully fledged independent Kurdish state grew stronger. As Turkish worries
mounted so did its antagonistic rhetoric against Iraqi Kurdish leaders, who
then turned callous to PKK presence on their territory.
In the past both the Barzani and Talabani
peshmerga fought alongside or provided logistic support for Turkish forces
chasing PKK militia on Iraqi soil. After all the PKK was a Turkish (or
better, Turkey’s) phenomenon and its armed existence was also a threat to
the authority of the Iraqi Kurdish leadership who did not want to share
their sovereignty, newly won from the Saddam government in the 1990s.
Today’s result must be due to a mixture of
the Turkish military’s constant pressure on the US authorities and the
complaints of an ally’s unfaithfulness in dire times. The other factor must
definitely be the soft approach of the Turkish government concerning talks
with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership and winning their hearts.
Now that the green light is in sight what
are the chances of success of the expected military operations to quell the
PKK and end the “Kurdish problem” once and for all? However, before saying
anything on the subject let us look at the results of a non-scientific (not
based on random sampling) poll taken by a newspaper (Hürriyet) last week
using electronic media.
To the question “Should the Turkish army
enter Iraq?” 302,135 people responded. Of these 34 percent said “Yes” and
58.8 percent said “No, it would be hazardous.” Another 7.2 percent wanted a
diplomatic solution. This figure boosts those who do not want a military
option to 76 percent. This is not a reliable survey but it gives an
impression of popular leanings, particularly because it was conducted by a
daily known for its nationalistic credentials. Yet the Turkish establishment
wants to go ahead with the military option. Why?
First of all, the Turkish ruling elite
cannot abandon the basic tenets of the nationalist ethos that says any group
other than the Turkish one is a potential danger to the national unity of
Turkey. So Kurds in general are suspect of separatist inclinations. Of
course the PKK’s terror campaign helps to keep this suspicion fresh and warm
for all times. However the thought of severing the tie that links millions
of Kurdish citizens in Turkey with this armed organization never occurred to
the Turkish ruling elite.
The security concept of Turkey has always
evaded the human nature of this concept. The methods realized by the armed
forces on the forefront have been harsh, whereas human measures to win the
people have been neglected. Hence the problem of any cultural or political
demand, no matter how reasonable, has been repressed on the grounds of
security, further widening the boundaries of opposition to the system.
The trajectory of opposition, slowly
evolving into resistance and from resistance to armed conflict has not been
fully grasped. A problem that could be solved at the
social-economic-political level (peacefully) has evolved into armed
confrontation further hiding the true nature of the issue. That is why the
Kurdish problem and violence are intertwined, making one indiscernible from
the other.
The US infatuation with dealing with
terrorism through military means has reinforced the traditional Turkish
attitude and allows no other option than organizing cross-border operations
as if the root cause of the problem lies in Iraq. Granted the impending
operations will be the litmus test of the correctness of the method employed
so far. Yet there are a few questions that beg to be answered.
1- There are about 1,000 to 1,500 PKK
militants in Turkey and 3,500 to 4,000 in camps and caves on Kandil in
northern Iraq. How come those in Turkey have not been eradicated? Will those
hiding in the mountain, well entrenched in the caves and labyrinths of
tunnels they have built in previous years, be smoked out?
2- Now that the word is out that Turkey
will attack them, will they sit there like ducks or disperse to safer
locations given the leniency of the local Kurdish administration and the US
command that see the possibility of using this organization’s influence on
the Kurdish opposition movements in Syria and Iraq, the notorious members of
the axis of evil?
3- The Kandil Mountain is not that close to
Turkey. An infantry operation is out of question for logistical reasons and
the possible hostility of local Kurds. Hence an air and helicopter attack
must be planned. How effective would that be, given the territorial affinity
of the militia in the area? If this is the case, is this whole scheme a way
of letting off steam to ease the mounting political pressure on the Turkish
government and the military? Even that may ease the increasing radicalizing
nationalist surge in Turkey and increase the Justice and Development Party’s
(AK Party) electoral chances, just as helping the military to ease its
frustration vis-à-vis US intransigence that hampered relations between
Turkey and the US to a great extent.
4- What if local Kurds are hurt or
scenarios to that effect are hatched which may bring the Kurdish armed
forces, who have improved their capabilities in the past decade thanks to
their US patrons, in contact with the Turkish armed forces? From what we
read from the press the cross-border operation will be carried out by
approximately 40,000 men. According to international news sources, Kurdish
brigades have been sent to take part in the new Baghdad security plan.
“Kurdish brigades are well-trained to fight inside cities and neighborhoods,
and they will contribute vigorously in cleansing Baghdad’s suburbs of armed
men and outlaws,” (Gulf News). Amer Al Hussaini, a prominent figure in the
Shiite Sadr group, told Gulf News: “The Kurdish peshmerga forces which most
of the Iraqi army brigades are formed from, stationed in Dohuk, Arbil and
Suleimaniyah, amount to 80,000. This might rise to 120,000 because of the
escalation of security threats in Baghdad and also Turkey’s threats to the
federal Kurdistan region regarding ownership of Kirkuk.” Given this
assessment, could there be an “accident” that may turn the whole affair into
a local bloody entanglement?
These are necessary questions that must be
asked before an operation that will yield more psychological results than
actual is carried. But there are two practical initiatives that must be
considered if Turkey must really rid itself of this problem that has reached
the level of a gangrene poisoning the country.
1- It must distinguish between the Kurdish
problem that will and must be settled within Turkey and political violence
perpetrated by the PKK with the excuse that the Kurdish problem is not yet
solved.
2- Despite the existing suspicions and
tensions, Turkey and Iraqi Kurds need each other. A Kurdish entity in
northern Iraq could become a buffer between Turkey and the turmoil to the
south while Turkey could become the business partner and protector of a
Kurdish entity that, though still technically part of Iraq, is effectively
cut loose from a Baghdad if a united Iraq becomes an impossibility.
To realize this Turkey must remember that
not foes but the relatives of its citizens are living across its southern
borders and the Iraqi Kurds must convince the suspicious Turks that their
existence is more of a boon to Turkey in all respects rather than plotting
to provoke their brethren in Turkey to created a bonfire that may consume
them as well during the fight to extinguish it. |
