Invasion Is The
Wrong Answer To Turkey's Problems
By Wesley Clark
November 16 2007
Financial Times
Just over a week after US president George W. Bush and Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
Turkey's prime minister, met in Washington, Turkish troops remained poised to
move across the border into Iraqi Kurdistan in an attempt to destroy elements of
the Kurdistan Workers party (PKK). We can only hope that a solution based on the
idea of joint co-operation against the PKK that seemed to be forged in the Oval
Office meeting, focusing on diplomatic engagement between the US, Turkey, Iraq
and the Kurdistan Regional Government, will trump the still-looming military
assault.
The Turks are understandably angry and ready for war. Accumulated frustrations
over recent attacks by the PKK erupted in public demands for a decisive military
solution. Turkish popular opinion strongly supported attacks on rebel base camps
inside Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Turkish armed forces have mobilised more than
100,000 troops on the Iraqi border, setting the stage for a massive Turkish
invasion of northern Iraq that would have disastrous consequences.
On paper all wars seem simple. Turkish military planners may hope that one bold
thrust into Iraqi Kurdistan will, once and for all, eradicate the PKK. A glance
at what soldiers call the "troop-to-task" ratio might suggest that the job could
be done quickly. Turkey has a very good army and it would seem feasible that
100,000 well-trained and fully equipped Turkish troops could quickly capture or
kill 3,000 PKK rebels hiding in an area somewhat larger than Maryland.
But war is never simple. The friction and fog of war always conspire to make the
actual combat far more complex, time consuming and bloodier than the sterile and
optimistic plans written in the comfort of remote headquarters. Even the
military genius Alexander the Great was stalled by the inhospitable terrain of
southern Turkey (Northern Kurdistan) and northern Iraq (Southern Kurdistan).
Despite popular longing for a quick military solution, a Turkish invasion would
bring only stalemate and frustration and - more ominously - would destabilise
the region, undermine US-Turkish relations for decades, and jeopardise the
stability and prosperity of Iraq's Kurdistan region.
Turkey will certainly benefit by continuing on the more creative and diplomatic
path now being pursued by Mr Erdogan. He has secured a US promise to share
intelligence and to co-operate in neutralising PKK elements in Iraq and
preventing their movement across the border. He should open a dialogue with the
KRG to formulate joint measures to prevent the PKK from striking Turkey from
Iraqi territory. To that end, he needs to embrace the establishment of
four-party talks between Turkey, Iraq, the US and the KRG. This must be the way
forward.
War is not the answer, especially given the creative alternatives available.
First, strike the PKK where they are vulnerable, not in the mountain base camps
where they are strongest. Divide the enemy by crafting an amnesty that permits
civilians and lower level PKK members to lay down their arms and rejoin society.
This worked in Northern Ireland to isolate radical fringes of the Irish
Republican Army and it will work here, where the PKK's popular support at best
is tepid.
Second, the US and others could cripple PKK operations by cutting off its
financial support. The PKK's centre of power is not, and never has been, in
Iraqi Kurdistan; its popular base lies in south-eastern Turkey. Its financial
base is in the cities of continental Europe, where the money is raised. Its
leaders travel freely in European capitals. A co-ordinated international effort
is needed to interdict the flow of money and supplies to the PKK.
Decades of military action against the PKK have failed to produce a lasting
solution and it would fail again. Albert Einstein was not a military strategist
but he did know something about how to solve problems. He also recognised the
folly of substituting haste for thoughtful, reasoned decision-making when he
said: "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when
we created them."
Dealing with the PKK is an essential element of resolving the larger conflict in
Iraq and improving the peace in the region. This challenge requires a creative
strategy, one rooted in diplomacy and dialogue. Most of all it requires leaders
with vision who rise above raw emotion - courageous leaders who are willing to
forgo short-term violent actions in order to wisely serve their nation's
long-term interests.
General Clark is a former supreme commander of Nato, led the alliance of
military forces in the Kosovo war (1999) and is a senior fellow at the Ron
Burkle Center at UCLA
