By Zvi Bar'el
Oct 17, 2007
Haaretz (Isreali paper)
The beautiful hilly road leading from the city of Duhok in western Kurdistan to
the city of Sulaimani in the eastern district could have been an impressive
tourist attraction. In fact, ever since Saddam Hussein's regime was toppled,
Kurdish and Turkish entrepreneurs have been dreaming of establishing a ski
complex and paths for jeep trips here. When I visited the region in August, a
member of the Kurdish government suggested giving the Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers
a new job: escorting tour buses and jeeps on trips in the field. "In any case,
it's very quiet here and there is no need for all these soldiers. Let them at
least bring money into our country through tourism." The visitor to the region
also gets the impression that there will be no shortage of luxury jeeps in which
to transport the tourists: Almost every middle-ranking official drives a 4X4.
The Kurdish district is an independent state in everything but name. It is also
the calmest area in all of Iraq, thanks to the dense filter installed by the
Kurds to prevent the incursion of terrorist groups: a deep trench around the
capital of Arbil; a multi-layered system of roadblocks; invasive intelligence,
and close civil cooperation with the Kurdish security forces. If there is any
success story in the war in Iraq, it is undoubtedly Kurdistan.
This quiet was violated this week by the suspicious neighbor Turkey. On Saturday
and Sunday, Turkish cannons shelled "empty areas" in the high Kandil Mountains
northeast of Duhok.
Although the shelling did not cause any casualties or any real damage, they
aroused a fear of war in the region, particularly considering the fact that last
week, Turkey deployed about 60,000 of its soldiers along the border, and its
leaders declared they intended to invade Kurdistan to pursue PKK who are members
of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). The Turkish authorities claim that the
attackers infiltrate Turkey via the mountains and carry out terror activities
there, like the one in early October in which 15 Turkish soldiers and another 12
citizens were killed. Turkey also accuses the PKK of firing mortars from
Kurdistan at areas inside Turkey.
This week, the Turkish parliament is expected to grant approval to the
government to carry out the incursion, thereby providing the legal basis for
this comprehensive military action. But although the PKK is included on the U.S.
State Department list of terrorist organizations, and ostensibly an action
against it should receive Washington's blessing, the last thing the Bush
administration wants at the moment is a Turkish-Kurdish war on Iraqi soil. The
commander of the American forces in Iraq, General David Petraeus, was not
exaggerating when he warned this week that such a move on the part of Turkey was
liable to damage his forces' supply lines.
Kurdistan is off-limits
About 70 percent of the air cargo that reaches the U.S. Army in Iraq originates
in Turkey, as does about 30 percent of the fuel used by the army. If the border
crossing is closed or a war begins in the area, the Kurds are liable to decide
to remove their thousands of Peshmerga soldiers who serve in the Baghdad region
to fight against the Turks, significantly undermining the ability of the
American forces in Baghdad and its surroundings to confront the challenges
awaiting them.
But it is not only the U.S. that fears the possibility that this quiet region, a
model of success, will become a combat zone. Turkey also has reason for concern.
About 80 percent of the infrastructure work in Kurdistan is carried out by
Turkish companies. Overland commerce between Turkey and Kurdistan is estimated
at about $5 billion (out of a total of about $10 billion, which represents the
value of the merchandise that crosses into Iraq via the border crossing in Habur).
Convoys of thousands of heavy trucks that wait at the border crossing every day
attest to the huge volume of trade. Turkey is also the supplier of electricity
to the western part of Kurdistan, and needs Kurdish cooperation to ensure that
its economic presence, which is the basis for its strategic presence, continues
to exist without interference.
Ostensibly, it would be natural to expect Turkey to conduct direct negotiations
with the Kurdish leadership to try to reach a solution to the problem of the
PKK. But the meaning of conducting such direct negotiations is recognition of
the independence of the district. That is why Turkey, as opposed to Iran, is
refraining even from establishing a consulate there, and its citizens have to
risk their lives when they are forced to travel to Baghdad to get a visa to
visit Turkey.
Turkey wants the Iraqi government, which this month signed an agreement for
cooperation against terror, to take action against the members of the PKK. But
it is clear both to the Iraqi government and to Turkey that such a demand is
similar to the Israeli demand that the Palestinian Authority fight Hamas, with
one significant difference: Palestinian security people can, theoretically,
enter Hamas-dominated areas, but in Kurdistan not a single Iraqi soldier would
dare to cross the imaginary borderline between the Kurdish region and other
parts of Iraq. Kurdistan is off-limits to any Iraqi arms bearer who is not
Kurdish. In fact, the Iraqi flag cannot even be found in Kurdistan. Therefore
the Turkish demand of the U.S. to pressure the Iraqi government to fight against
the PKK raises a bitter smile in Washington. After all, the Iraqi government is
not even capable of fighting against terrorists who are nearby, not to mention
in distant hilly regions.
24 operational incursions
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's interview with CNN this week
attests perhaps more than anything to the paradox in which Turkey finds itself.
"We need the permission [of the Turkish parliament - Z.B.] so we can take steps
when there is a need to do so," Erdogan said. However, in light of the attacks
of the PKK, the most suitable time to take those steps is now. Then why is
Erdogan waiting? The practical explanation is that Turkey has carried out 24
operational incursions into Kurdish territory, which did not bring the desired
results. Erdogan is apparently also waiting for the upcoming meeting next month
with U.S. President George W. Bush to examine what Turkey can receive for not
attacking in Iraq. And no less important, Turkey is waiting to see how the U.S.
Congress will vote on the question of defining the killing of the Armenians as
genocide in the last years of the Ottoman empire.
Erdogan must demonstrate military determination against the most recent terror
activities in Turkey, because the prestige of his government also depends on it.
His Justice and Development Party presented itself in the July elections as a
nationalist party, and now it must prove to the public that it fights terror no
less than any other nationalist body. The problem is "only" to find a balance
between the need to take American interests into consideration, and the need to
align with the political pressures at home.
The government of the Kurdish region in Iraq is also well-aware of this paradox.
It has sworn itself to silence and instructed all its representatives not to
speak publicly on the subject. Although the Kurdish press is raising fists, and
op-eds published in the press explain that "the Kurds are not afraid of anyone,
not even Turkey," President Massoud Barzani is uncharacteristically quiet. This
is the same president who only a few months ago warned Turkey that if it
intervened in events in the Kurdish region in Iraq, the Kurds in Iraq would
"intervene" in what happens among the Kurds in Turkey. The statement that gave
rise to a profound political conflict between the parties, to the point of a
threat of Turkish sanctions against Kurdistan.
For now, Erdogan is in no rush to embark on a campaign inside Iraq. He fully
understands the American lesson in Iraq. Also, the fact that the Americans, the
Iraqis and the Europeans are currying favor with Turkey isn't a harmful thing
for the nation. The border between Iraq and Turkey will continue to serve the
merchants rather than the army.
