By: Huseyin Piran

Sep 21, 2005

For a political community to flourish there must be at least agreement on the rules of the game. The notion of politics includes the methods for choosing the holders of executive, judicial and legislative power. It covers what they are entitled to do. It concerns both the legitimacy and limits of power.

Political authority should derive from the people, to whom the government is accountable and by whom it is elected.

Yet the requirements of the contemporary political culture go beyond these formal preconditions. A multi-ethnic society is politically workable if and only if it shares a broad political culture when the civic affiliation is stronger than individuals multiple identities. Only then the citizens are likely to accept the outcome of elections against their wishes as legitimate. This definition of legitimacy distinguishes the successful multi-ethnic states from the failed ones.  

Turkey moved from absolutist rule at the beginning of the 20th century to an uneasy democracy facing army takeovers in each subsequent decade; its people defer, with some resentment, to the authority of the state (namely Turkish Army), relying on state-supported enterprises and a bureaucracy that has led the Turkish state since 1923 and governs life through manifold regulations.  Republican Turkey was built by refugees such as Ataturk, driven out of countries in the Balkans, South Russia, Caucasus or the Middle East where their people had been established for centuries. The political and above all military culture they built was essentially defensive.

The Turkish Army, which considers itself the guardian of Ataturk's legacy, determines that Kurdish nationalism is a major threat to the foundations of the republic and will be boosted in case of recognition of Kurdish national identity with further reforms at the eve of EU accession talks.  The positive developments in Iraq bringing more freedom for Kurds revive the Turkish Kemalists traditional concerns of territorial disintegration.

These fears highlight and explain the defensive reflexes of Kemalism, resulting in a national identity crises. Beneath the notion of a Turkish identity lies a tension, still noticeable today.

In February, a Swiss newspaper quoted Orhan Pamuk, well-known Turkish novelist, on Turkey's longstanding refusal to discuss the Armenian genocide and the more recent deaths of over 30,000 Kurdish guerillas. These remarks inflamed Turkish nationalists, forcing Pamuk to leave the country. He has been charged with public denigration of the Turkish identity and faces the possibility of 3 years in jail. The charges against Orhan Pamuk highlight the lack of free speech in Turkey, violating one of the prerequisites of admission to the European Union.

Last Month, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Amed (Diyarbekir) in Northern Kurdistan where he promised a new government initiative to address Kurdish demands for greater cultural rights. The distinguishing aspect of that visit was it marked the first time a Turkish Prime Minister stated the existence of a Kurdish Question. Turkish generals and some Kemalist columnists voiced their protests and regrets regarding the Prime Minister's phrase.  

Armed clashes between PKK guerillas and Turkish troops were interrupted after the incarceration of the movement's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 2001.  Ocalans's political thoughts immediately changed after the imprisonment. On several occasions Ocalan mentioned his mother was a Turk, and expressed his warm feelings about Kemalist ideology. Ocalan had monthly meetings with his lawyers and relatives; these conversations were taped word for word and leaked out to public. Controversially, Ocalan was siding with Turkish Generals and criticizing the liberal Islamist Erdogan government for not sticking to Kemalist ideals. He criticized the allied intervention to Iraq for toppling the despotic Saddam regime and he blamed Southern Kurdistan leadership for collaborating with American imperialism. For PKK supporters, this was not an easy one to digest. Since it would be hard to explain the grounds for obedience to a leader who is betraying his own ideals and is being manipulated by his enemy, PKK is losing its mass support both in the country and abroad. 

Taking into consideration the human rights violations and even killings in Turkish Prisons last couple of years, it should be impossible to believe that an arrested leader of a guerilla movement would be sending his directives out to his supporters. Although PKK broke the ceasefire last year and has increased attacks this summer, Ocalan, as the leader of the movement, is able to send out his orders through his lawyers. Meanwhile, the military complains that the reformer- Islamist government is not doing enough to fight against terrorism. Turkish commanders constantly voice their desire for a unilateral intervention in the mountains of Southern Kurdistan.

The Turkish government should keep the Turkish Army away from Kurdistan. Turkey has already taken significant steps toward EU integration such as loosening the military's grip on the political system and freeing its economy. Turkey's desire to join European Union has been a profound opportunity for positive change. Turkey should not miss its historic opportunity.

I quote from the latest book of Noah Feldman who was Senior Constitutional Adviser of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, Turkey [should] realize it has more to gain from than to lose from the existence of a Kurdish buffer state between its European Unionist aspirations and Iraqi violence (What We Owe Iraq-Princeton/2004, p35).