Mr. Talabani as President, a Triumph or a defeat for the Kurds?

By: Mirza Nammo

April 9, 2005

Canada

For a long time getting one of the top two positions in the Iraqi government has been the goal of the two main Kurdish parties PUK & KDP, and they were disappointed when they lost it during the appointment of the interim Iraqi government last time, but the results of January 2005 elections put the Kurds of Iraq in a position to ask for one of the two jobs in the Iraqi government, and since the Kurds hold the balance of power in that country for this term, they were able to be more assertive on getting the president’s position in the new government as the prime-minister’s position will go to the Shiites. Looking at it from the perspective of the two main Kurdish parties, it is a triumph for them as political groups to have Mr. Talabani as the president of Iraq. 

Why Mr. Talabani and not someone else from south Kurdistan for that post?

Mr. Talabani’s nomination was not arbitrary or the result of a popularity contest in Kurdistan, but it was the result of behind close door meetings and several secret deals that was reached between KDP and PUK to share power and economic resources both in Kurdistan and in Iraq, Mr. Talabani was nominated and indorsed by both parties to be a candidate for the position of the Iraqi president, and together they succeeded in putting him in that position.     

Mr. Talabani who is in his seventies has been in politics since he was just a school boy. Of course by now he is by any account a veteran politician and rebel leader who has dealt with many Iraqi politicians and governments; he also had a lot of dealings with the governments of the areas neighboring Iraq, and since the first gulf war, he had dealings with European and American powers too, so there is an old relationship existing between Mr. Talabani and the stakeholders from anywhere.

It is that knowledge that the stakeholders have of Talabani’s personal profile, and his goals and ambitions that makes him a good choice for Iraq from the perspective of Iraqi Arabs and the very worried Iraqi neighbors because they know Talabani is very eager and willing to compromise with foreigners as long as he gets something to keep him in the game and be accepted as a player. However, those are qualities Mr. Talabani has which make him a dreadful choice for Kurdistan especially when we evaluate Talabani’s past compromises and the bad choices he has made with those stakeholders outside of Kurdistan to keep him in the game. However, it also has to be mentioned that this is not a trend unique to Mr. Talabani alone, but it is a trend common to the personalities of all Kurdish leaders in all parts of Kurdistan in our modern history.  

Although, the dilemmas and the complexities of the Kurdish Iraqi relationship are great, but it still can be influenced by the credentials and the charisma as well as the contacts of any candidate for a high governmental position such as president or prime minister because that is just the nature of politics in the Middle East in general and South Kurdistan is no exception. The Shiite majority of newly elected Iraqi national assembly is fully aware of what kind of benefits Talabani can bring with him as president to lessen the demands of the Kurds as well as the hostilities of the Sunni neighbors of Iraq.

We got a glimpse of the cozy relationships that Mr. Talabani has with the enemies of Kurds when a Turkish delegation met with him on February 2005 to provide him with a list of demands for his next job, and at the end of the meeting the Turks confirmed that they approve of Talabani’s nomination for the post of presidency in Iraq. This is something that needs to be studied much more closely by the Kurds because the Turks usually foam at the mouth and bark in every direction like a mad dog when the word Kurd is mentioned, so one has to wonder what kind of deals Talabani has made with them, and what kind of promises Talabani made to them to calm the Turks down and have them behave like a well mannered pussycat when they came out of that meeting?   

Mr. Talabani probably is fully aware of the fact that his reputation in Kurdistan is hanging in the balance and he might lose his foothold even in the areas that is now under his control if Kurds view him as the one who sold Kurdish rights to get him a fancy job and a good retirement package because part of the deal Talabani made with KDP to indorse him as a candidate for presidency is to make Barzani leader of Kurdistan, so if things doesn’t go well, he also runs the risk of making Barzani the popular leader and himself the demon of Kurdish politics, but perhaps that is why from the beginning PUK's propaganda machine had started a fierce campaign often with Talabani himself as the poster guy in front and repeating at every occasion that the Kurdish demands comes first and then the demands for posts in the new Iraqi government. 

However, these promises do not take Kurdish concerns away and still the promises of Kurdish leaders are very vague since their plans for Kurdish demands in Iraq are as always vague, and no one for sure knows what exactly is the demands and where do they want it because there is not a single document from the Kurdish political parties to clearly identify the geography of south Kurdistan and the their demands for the type of federalism that the Kurdish political parties want with the rest of Iraq. It is always left for the last minute deals that they can get without much input from the people or even their own party members.

But, all that aside, and if we assume for a moment that all of what the two main Kurdish parties have planed for will be implemented without obstacles, still their approach and plans for partnership with Iraq is a great defeat for the Kurds in southern Kurdistan even if Mr. Talabani turns out to be the best president that Iraq ever could have. Because the Kurds are a separate nation not a small minority in Iraq, and when PUK and KDP accepted the Arab notion of treating the Kurds as minority in Iraq, they assured Kurdish defeat regardless of negotiation outcomes and temporary deals or governmental positions for party leaders, since all deals could change as soon as the next election.

The situation that we have in Iraq can not be resolved with simple democratic rituals, even if Iraqis learn how to conduct themselves in that manner, but given the fact that the Iraqi people are light years away from understanding what democracy is makes the matter even worse for South Kurdistan.

The game of ratio is a deadly game for a small nation to get involved in with a bigger nation because not only the smaller nation will always lose even if democracy will always prevails in the dealings, but the smaller nation also will lose their status as a nation, and they will be reduced to a small minority within another nation, and it will be a constant battle to get the very basic rights for the smaller nation.

So why do the current Kurdish leaders work so hard to reduce the status of South Kurdistan from distinct and separate nation from Iraq to a small minority within Iraq?

It is the democratic right of PUK and KDP and any other party for that matter in south Kurdistan to want to be in partnership with Iraq, but that partnership must be on the basis of equality not the percentage of population. The Kurdish parties have already voluntarily given up parts of Kurdistan such as the city of Mosul, and have accepted to wait for a census to decide the fate of other parts of Kurdistan such as Karkuk and other disputed cities based on the ratio of Kurds in those cities, and by these they completely ignored the historical geography of south Kurdistan and subjected Kurdish rights in Iraq into second class citizens because this game of ratio is not applied to the Arab cities. For example the ratio of Kurds in Baghdad is much more greater than the ratio of Arabs or Turkmen in Karkuk, but no one is putting the Arabism of Baghdad on hold until a census is done to find out what percentage of Baghdad is indeed Arabs.

An optimist of the Iraqi situation might argue and say that all these concerns are for nothing because they all could be dealt with in the coming months in the impending Iraqi constitution. However, the reality of the situation indicates that that is a very wishful thinking. Iraq might not be able to have a permanent constitution that could be ratified by the required majority of Iraqis for a very long time because the vision of a free and democratic Iraq just does not exist in the minds of any of the power-seeking players in Iraq.

Furthermore, the interim Iraqi laws are designed in such a way to create the needed delays for the Americans. And the purpose of these delays is to disable Iraqis from accomplishing much until Iraq in terms of power consolidation and security force is strong enough to implement the American programs without direct American military interference. A parallel to what the English did in the 1920s when they curved out Iraq from the defeated Ottoman Empire. One example of this is the article 58 that the Kurdish leaders are so happy about, but any body who knows a little about law and the psychology of the Iraqi people would tell you that article 58 is the worst thing for a country like Iraq because it could put Iraqi national assembly into a loop and make it impossible to come up with a constitution for the country that will be acceptable by all provinces, and this will allow Iraq to be governed by temporary laws that will be changed based on the reality of the day, and those realities might not be in the best interest of the  Kurds because the Sunni Arabs will not boycott every election, so the Kurds could get enough seats to have a say in the national assembly. 

Thus, the Kurds unfortunately cannot claim victory because KDP and PUK managed to accomplish one of their dreams and make Mr. Talabani president of Iraq for about the next eight month. The only time the Kurds in the south can claim victory is when they triumph over the internal obstacles of Kurdish tribal politics. then they can say to the rest of Iraq that the best way to be in one country is to be fully equal regardless of the population ratio because the geography of Kurdistan is clear, and on that land there will be an elected Kurdish government in control of every aspect of law, economics, and military, and when our Arab neighbors in Iraq managed the same things, then we will discus the nature of our federalism which will be on the basis of military and economic cooperation, open border, and a common foreign policy.