KurdistanObserver.com

Faik Bulut: 'Preparing the new Iraqi constitution -- the main risk factor'

Tuesday, February 8, 2005

KDP leader Barzani recently noted that an independent Kurdish state would be formed. Faik Bulut who has traveled widely in Kurdish areas says that 90 percent of Kurds want this but 70 percent of the political establishment finds it unrealistic

GÜL DEMIR

ISTANBUL – Turkish Daily News

As people await the outcome of the elections in Iraq, the Kirkuk problem, which previously created tension, has grown because of mutual statements made by the sides involved.

First, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani stated that Iraqi Kurds wanted control of the prime ministry in the new government. Later Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Massoud Barzani noted that an independent Kurdish state would be formed. Turkey was not slow to react to these statements. Today Turkey is curious of what will happen in Kirkuk. The biggest concern is that the result of the elections will create chaos in Kirkuk.

American Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith stated that the Kirkuk problem could not be solved by a single group and said, “This problem should be solved within Iraq's territorial integrity.” What is the situation in Kirkuk? What will happen after the election results are released? Writer Faik Bulut talked exclusively to the Turkish Daily News about the elections in Iraq and the Kirkuk problem.

When asked about the risk of ethnic division in Iraq after the elections and its potential impact on the formation of a new Iraqi constitution, Bulut pointed out that there has always been the risk of ethnic and religious division since the beginning of the U.S. occupation in Iraq and it continues today. He continued, “There is a great risk in regions like Mosul and Kirkuk where there is ethnic variety because many foreign countries like Syria, Iran, Turkey and Arab countries, which have connections with Iraq, will intervene in the event of an ethnic or religious clash. Of course the U.S. and Kurds will intervene. One cannot expect such a situation to remain static. (With Shiites in the south, Sunnis in the middle and Kurds in the north) will Iraq be the stage of ethnic clashes? There is such a risk in the existing situation.”

When it came to asking whether Turkey had put enough effort into the Kirkuk issue, Bulut said that there were many mistakes and contradictions in Turkey's Iraqi policy. Despite Turkey saying, “It is a reason for war if Kurds enter Kirkuk or Mosul,” and defining its red lines, it couldn't do anything there. It couldn't talk about the core of the Turkmen issue. It couldn't give the initiative to the Turkmen by taking them from Turkey and making them work for example as security employees. It humiliated Talabani and Barzani by saying, “They are not states but tribal chiefs and peshmergas (Kurdish fighters) but on the other hand it had talks with them on the Turkmen issue. It couldn't clearly express what it wanted over the Kirkuk issue. Does it want oil? What percentage of the oil money does it want in accordance with the agreement signed in 1926? Does it want the whole of Kirkuk and Mosul? Because of that these issues were not clarified, and Turkey couldn't express its concerns in the international arena.”

“When Iraqi Kurds entered Kirkuk, Turkey saw them as threatening factors and produced the wrong policies. It couldn't create a policy towards the Kirkuk problem by becoming the friend of the Kurds in Iraq. It saw smaller groups as threatening sources instead of the states which occupied the region. Tensions increased when it turned its back on the Kurds whom it saw as the main threatening factor. These tensions were reflected in Turkmen and Kurdish clashes. It couldn't fulfill its responsibility to prevent ethnic clashes in Mosul, Kirkuk and Telafar. How many mistakes the Kurds have made there is another issue.

“We are talking about Turkey and I am speaking about Turkey's deficiencies. More importantly, provocative factors out of the state's control were overlooked in Mosul and Kirkuk. These factors are trying to provoke the Kirkuk issue through a nationalist and chauvinist approach. Briefly, this is a future danger for Turkey. Because of that Turkey couldn't determine its enemies and sources of threat, it couldn't determine a policy to follow. Turkey doesn't know Iraq well despite all its assertions. Its consultants and determining factors considered the issue from a narrow angle, Turkey lost its red lines and one may consider that it has lost Kirkuk too. Turkey also lost its peaceful role and effectiveness.”

Of course that brings one around to what the impact would be on Turkey of the formation of a Kurdish state as Barzani has mentioned. Bulut has visited Kurdish regions frequently and believes that 90 percent of Kurds dream of a Kurdish state that might also include Iran, Syria and Turkey. “But for 70 percent of Kurds, political establishment doesn't seem realistic. They always say that it is not realistic to form a state. In a statement that he made after the elections, Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoshyar Zebari harshly criticized the petition for an independent Kurdish state signed by 170,000 people and sent to the United Nations, and said, ‘They are making things harder for us and we shouldn't take notice of utopias.' That means Kurds living there are adopting a realistic position. Also, I find all broadcasts and propaganda that a Kurdish state will be formed in Turkey wrong because when you look at the programs and strategies of both parties, you see that they are satisfied with federation. The war caused nationalistic winds to blow among the Kurds in the region and created an objective motivation. Kurds are growing closer to each other, there is solidarity among them. But this won't turn into a state over the short or the long term. Conditions will determine whether it turns into a state over the next 30-40 years. What is important is the impact of a federal and autonomous structure on Turkey. Is it necessary to overlook the fact that the Iraqi Kurdish region will become a magnet for Kurds in Iran, Turkey or Syria in order to eliminate these effects? Or will you make Turkey a magnet that other Kurds will covet? When the Kurds are given their democratic rights, the Kurds in Turkey will become a magnet for other Kurds. Ankara will become a place to be taken as an example. Things done by drawing red lines and threats will make the Iraqi Kurdish region a magnet. When we consider it objectively, the Iraqi Kurdish region is taken by other Kurds as an example. If Turkey wants to abolish the dangers of the Kurds and divisiveness, it must regulate its relations and develop projects to help economically and politically.”