By: Semih Idiz

Tension over Kirkuk between Ankara, the Kurds of northern Iraq and Washington appears to be mounting -- judging by recent statements emanating from Prime Minister Erdogan. It is interesting to note that these statements have more anger embedded in them than do the statements coming from the military wing of late -- where concerns about developments in northern Iraq are expressed in a much more guarded fashion.

Inevitably, many are concluding -- on the basis of these angry remarks -- which Turkey is poised to intervene militarily if political developments in Kirkuk are not to Ankara's liking. This at least appears to be the way the matter is being picked up in the West and the Arab world. It is also the way mainstream Turkish papers are approaching the matter.

It must be said at the outset that angry as Erdogan's remarks may be, they still contain a critical safety valve, which should not be overlooked. He is basically saying that Turkey cannot remain a mere observer if things get out of hand in Kirkuk, making it clear, in so many words, that he is referring to the possibility of violence breaking out in that oil-rich city, and turning into a pogrom against the city's indigenous Turkmen. It goes without saying that in such an event, not just Turkey, but no one can remain a bystander.

The possibility of inter-communal violence in Kirkuk is there, of course, as was stated recently in a report prepared by the Brussels based International Crisis Group. But there are also those who believe that it is unlikely the Kurds will be the initiators of any inter-communal violence, given that things are generally going their way in post-Saddam Iraq.

None of this, however, alters the fact that the line the Turkish government is pursuing is being picked up by nationalist groups as a sign that Ankara will intervene militarily if the demographic manipulation by the Kurds in Kirkuk is codified as a result of Sunday's elections. This is where the position taken by the government becomes something of an enigma; because -- while it is clear that the subtle safety valve mentioned above exists -- Erdogan must be aware that his remarks are agitating nationalist groups in a way that is bound to rebound on his government.

“Why so?” The answer is simple. If the impression is created that Turkey will intervene militarily, if political developments in Kirkuk are not to her liking, and it is seen in the end that there is no legal or rational basis for Ankara to do so, and that she therefore cannot do this, then the one who will end up in the firing line will be Erdogan. He will be accused then by the same nationalists that he agitated of being “politically spineless,” and therefore “selling out on Iraq once again.”

Of course, Turkey can intervene in Iraq militarily if she wants. She has the capacity to do so. There would, however, be a very serious political and economic price to pay if she does so without a discernible threat to her security, or the existence of pogroms against the Turkmen. The price paid will not only include ruined ties with the U.S. the E.U. -- not to mention the Arab world where her prestige is currently high -- but also being dragged into a military quagmire that will last years.

This is why there appears to be more sense prevailing on this whole question on the military wing today. It must also be said that senior Turkish diplomats incline more towards the cautious line adopted by the military, than the government's bellicosity on this score. The question that diplomats in Ankara are asking is, what is Erdogan trying to achieve by upping the ante, as he has been doing of late, against Washington and the Kurds.

The answer for many Turkish observers is clear. He is playing into a domestic gallery for the sake of politicking. In other words, he is trying to court a hard-core Sunni nationalist element that is prevalent in Turkey, and which also has a not so negligible presence within the AKP. If this is the case, though, one cannot refer to this as “leadership,” since playing to the gallery in this way has more to do with demagoguery than anything else.

Erdogan brought this hard-core nationalist group into line over many sensitive issues -- including Cyprus -- prior to the December 17 Brussels summit, which gave Turkey a date for the start of membership talks with the EU. He should do the same on Iraq in general, and northern Iraq in particular.

Instead of stirring the hornet's nest of nationalism, Erdogan should be paving the way for Turkey to play a positive and proactive role in Iraq by maintaining, among other things, a mutually beneficial dialogue with the Iraqi Kurds -- who are clearly not going to disappear because some in Turkey want -- instead of projecting an image of bellicosity which is bound to drive the Kurds and U.S. even closer, and alienate Turkey in the West generally.