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KurdistanObserver.com
European Turkey Civic Commission EUTCC:
Report
Feb 12,
2006
EUROPEAN TURKEY CIVIC COMMISSION - EUTCC
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY
1. Introduction
The EU Turkey Civic Commission (EUTCC) would like to present its views on the
perspectives of the accession negotiations between the European Union and
Turkey.
The EUTCC is genuinely supportive of Turkey’s aspirations to become a member of
the EU. We believe this is the best opportunity Turkey will have to become a
truly democratic country, with full respect for the rule of law and human
rights. However, it is obvious that Turkish membership must be conditional on
the full implementation of all accession criteria, including respect for and
protection of minorities There must be no bargaining or reductions in the
standards of compliance for geopolitical or other extraneous reasons.
After some observations on the 2005 Progress Report, the present paper limits
itself to discussing five main problem areas, which in many ways represent an
acid test for Turkey’s aspirations to membership of the European Union:
· Torture
· Freedom of expression
· Freedom of association - political parties
· The judiciary
· The role of the military
2. General observations on the Progress Report
The 2005 Progress Report describes in some detail both the achievements and
shortcomings with regard to Turkey’s progress towards implementation of the
accession criteria. The EUTCC does realise that the EU and the Government of
Turkey are operating within the framework of normal diplomatic relations. This
understandably colours the language of the Progress Report, which tends to give
the reader the impression that the overall progress has been substantial, and
that the remaining problems are limited, primarily relating to improved
implementation. This is also how the Report has been interpreted in the media
and the political circles in Turkey.
However, when reading all the cases where no or only limited progress has been
achieved, the rather rosy language in many parts of the Report is not
substantiated by the hard facts on the ground. Even less rosy is the picture
when one realises that the cases referred to in the Report are just examples,
the tip of an iceberg.
Generally speaking, it is primarily at the level of adoption of legislation that
some real progress has been achieved. And even at that level, much remains to be
done. In fact, in some cases, there has been regression rather than progress.
This includes what was proclaimed to be the big step forward: the new Penal
Code. However, the reality is that there has been a rush among members of the
judiciary to clamp down on freedom of expression, based on authoritarian
legislation such as the new Article 301.
It is noteworthy that most of the recent cases where the Turkish judiciary has
failed blatantly in recognising and following European human rights standards,
are related to the situation of “non-Turkish citizens”. This applies
particularly to the situation of the greatest non-Turkish population, the Kurds.
The cases have revealed and emphasized, again and again, how deep-rooted and
sensitive the Kurdish issue is in a strongly nationalistic state.
The EUTCC believes that this will prove to be the major hurdle on the way to a
genuine acceptance and implementation of European values and standards. Freedom
of expression can be accepted generally in Turkey, as long as it does not touch
the raw nerve: the nationalistic ideology and its sequel, the Kurdish problem.
The Ottoman empire, with its multi-ethnic/cultural and political structure gave
the Kurdish people a great degree of autonomy. In the new Turkish republic, the
Kurdish people were not able to find a place either as a minority or as a
cultural-political identity group. The discrimination against the Kurds and the
assimilation policies led to uprisings and unrest, which have continued until
our time. In turn, this reinforced anti-democratic and authoritarian political
structures, hampering the development of a genuine democratic society.
The EUTCC believes there can be no progress in this field, unless the Turkish
political establishment, as well as major parts of the public, accept the rights
of the Kurdish population. This issue is not focused on adequately and clearly
in the Progress Report. As a result, Turkish authorities, media and large
sectors of the population, were triumphant when reading the Progress Report and
discovering that the Kurds were not described as a minority. Nationalistic
elements are using this as a shield to protect their views, denying the identity
and the rights of 15 million Kurds.
The Turkish authorities have had little difficulty so far in accepting the
Copenhagen criteria, which specifically obliges Turkey to ensure “respect for
and protection of minorities”. However, Turkey has officially made it abundantly
clear that this acceptance is limited to those people who are defined as
minorities in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. In other words, Turkey claims the
exclusive right for itself to determine the extent of its commitments to the EU
and its standards and values. So far, this has not been challenged explicitly by
the EU.
Instead of describing the Kurdish problem as a main problem that Turkey must
face and resolve, the Report refers to “the situation in the Southeast”, the
expression favoured by Turkey. Only the Greeks are directly referred to as a
“minority”, again in line with the Turkish official position, although the
Report does state that under relevant international and European standards,
“other communities …. could [emphasis added] qualify as minorities”.
This ambiguous terminology lends itself to misleading the people of Turkey,
including many within the political establishment. Reading the Report, they
believe that the EU does not consider or does not insist that the Kurdish
population have rights under international and European law and standards,
whether the Kurds are conceived as a “people”, a “nation” or as a “minority”. A
genuine implementation of the Copenhagen criteria can only come about after the
Kurdish problem has been both recognised and resolved.
Prime Minister Erdogan said in September 2005 that he recognised the “Kurdish
issue”, and that it must be resolved through “more democratization”. His
statements could have given some degree of hope, and to many Kurds it did. On
the other hand it gave rise to a wave of loud protest among nationalistic
circles, including critical comments from the military. This shows the
admittedly difficult balancing act that the Government must perform between the
reforms required by the EU and the demands of the established nationalistic
ideology and its proponents, including the military. This is probably the reason
why, half a year later, no steps have been taken, not even at the verbal level,
towards a resolution of the Kurdish problem.
This lack of progress in the most difficult problem Turkey is facing is not
acceptable. The EU must insist on a “roadmap” to solve the Kurdish problem.
3. The Realities of the Present Situation
a) Torture, Police Brutality and Extra-judicial
Executions
Although there are conflicting reports and views, it appears that torture has
become less wide-spread than it used to be until recent times. This is
particularly the case at detention centres. On the other hand there are
increasing reports of torture or degrading treatment outside of the detention
centres, e.g. during apprehension or transportation to detention centres.
A complete picture of the situation on the ground is for obvious reasons not
easy to gather and document. The Turkish authorities are not particularly
forthcoming in this regard. It is illustrating to read in the report of
08.12.2005 from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT):
“Not for the first time during a CPT visit, the Committee’s delegation found
that certain law enforcement establishments which (according to the custody
registers) regularly hold a considerable number of detainees were practically if
not totally empty [emphasis added] during the time of the delegation’s visit.”
(Paragraph 6 of the Report).
In other words, these detention centres had been emptied before the visit of the
CPT to prevent embarrassing situations for the Turkish authorities!
Nonetheless, the CPT report refers to “numerous persons” alleging ill-treatment,
e.g.:
· “blows to the body, including on occasion falaka)”,
· “suspension by the arms”,
· “stripping naked and hosing with cold water”,
· “squeezing the genitals”,
· “immersing the head in water”,
· “asphyxiation using a plastic bag”.
The CPT also expressed its regret that “the Turkish authorities have not
provided replies to a number of issues” raised by the CPT during its visit in
2004, some of which “were clearly of an urgent nature”. The CPT also complained
about “inadequate or incomplete” response to its report on the September 2003
visit.
The CPT was in particular concerned about the failure to implement existing
regulations concerning the medical inspection of detainees. The CPT stated that
in many cases, the law enforcement officers were present during the medical
examination, which in many cases was very perfunctory.
The picture emerging from the CPT report is of a systematic and deliberate
procedure to evade the responsibilities of the Turkish authorities, and to
protect those who are guilty of torture.
The reports of Turkish and international NGOs are also not indicating much
progress. According to the records of the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT),
in its annual report dated 29.12.2005:
5 persons died in detention in 2005,
164 women, 10 children and 483 reported to the HRFT torture rehabilitation
centres having been tortured or ill-treated (180 of them in 2005) and in more
than half of the cases the torture or ill-treatment occurred outside detention
centres,
52 persons were shot to death and hundreds were wounded by security forces in
connection with armed clashes with PKK forces.
The training of police and security forces does not appear to have had the
desired effects. There are too many reports of police brutality, particularly
connected with public demonstrations. The beating and spraying with pepper gas
of men and women on the International Women’s Day in March are just one of many
examples. It was not helpful that Prime Minister Erdogan criticized the press
for having made critical comments on the case.
It is sad to observe that the system of extra-judicial executions performed by
the state’s security forces or with their collusion has not disappeared. There
have been various incidents, notably the Semdinli affair, where it appears clear
that security forces have been guilty of executions and killings.
The Progress Report notes that the security situation has worsened, and blame
this entirely on “the resumption of violence by the PKK”. It does note with
concern that “the security forces sometimes respond inappropriately”. However,
incidents like Semdinli indicate that this is not a question of an
“inappropriate” response to attacks by PKK. The reality is that certain
organized groups within the state have carried out planned attacks on civilians
and then tried to hold PKK responsible for these attacks.
Members of the Parliamentary Commission investigating the Semdinli incident have
vociferously expressed their disquiet at what they perceive as efforts to
manipulate the presentation of relevant evidence.
These incidents have resulted in protests and clashes between civilians and
security forces, during which several people were killed and many more injured.
The situation is volatile. Some Turkish media have speculated that “elements in
the ‘deep state’ are trying to provoke instability in order to win a freer hand
in the South East” (Turkish Daily News [TDN], 17/01/2006).
The military and other parts of the “deep state” continue to accuse the PKK of
organising and carrying out all these killings.
b) Freedom of Expression
The Progress Report optimistically predicts a “continued reduction in the number
of prosecutions and particularly convictions” in freedom of expression cases,
although it notes that there remain various provisions in the laws which are a
“potential” threat to freedom of expression. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul
proclaimed proudly to the Turkish parliament on 21 December that there was no
person in Turkish prisons convicted for the expression of non-violent thoughts (HRFT
annual report, 29/12/2005).
At the end of 2005, the situation on the ground looks much bleaker. It has
become clear that several articles of the new Penal Code are not only
“potential” threats, but are part of the daily reality in Turkey. The present
report would become far too voluminous if all the individual cases were to be
discussed here. Some of them are widely known, others do not reach the headlines
in the media.
The most illustrious example is perhaps the infamous new Article 301 of the
Penal Code. Rather than widening the freedom of expression, it has been used as
a powerful tool of repression. According to a recent report from “Reporters
without Borders”, this article has been used to charge or convict at least 22
journalists and writers since June 2005. The latest conviction was on 27
December, when Zulkuf Kisanik got a six months prison sentence for writing a
book investigating the destruction of Kurdish villages.
A realistic and sad picture of the Government’s priorities is given by the
Justice Minister’s attitude relating to the Pamuk case. Firstly, he refused to
consider prompt action to remedy the obvious anomaly, saying he needed to see
how the new article would be applied in practice. 22 cases in six months were
obviously not sufficient for him to discover the anomaly. Secondly, he
criticized Pamuk for not making “conciliatory remarks” and hinted that such a
move “would have prevented his prosecution”. He advised Pamuk to state publicly:
“I apologize to the nation”! (TDN, 07/01/2006). As if that was not enough, the
Justice Minister, while admitting the flaws in the justice system, added that
“Pamuk was also guilty”(Zaman, 27.01.2006).
According to the Turkish Publishers Union 2005 report, 37 writers were tried in
2004-2005, and cases initiated against 43 books and 4 compilations from 25
publishing houses. According to the HRFT, (29/12/2005) only in the month of
December there were trials in cases against:
2 executives of political parties,
26 journalists, editors, correspondents, TV producers, translators,
photographers,
3 human rights defenders,
1 news agency,
6 publishing houses.
Not a single private broadcaster has so far been permitted to broadcast in
Kurdish (HRW, Annual Report 2005).
There are some new and disturbing developments in freedom of expression cases.
One is the trend of nationalistic groups and individuals (often with connections
to the “deep state”) to file complaints and urge the prosecutors to “do their
duty”! This has resulted in several cases being opened, which are manifestly
unfounded under European standards (one of the cases referred to the newly
coined expression: “the deep judiciary”!). In addition, these nationalistic
groups interfere with an orderly conduct of the trials,which the judges seem
unable to control. The training provided by the EU to the judiciary (15 mill €
allocated for 2005) seems to have had only limited effect so far.
Another trend is based on a bizarre interpretation of the article that prohibits
attempts to influence the decisions of the judiciary, as an alternative crime to
“insults” against the court. These provisions are now being construed so as to
stifle any negative comments on decisions within the judiciary, in cases that
are uncomfortable for the nationalistic ideology. For Turkey the goal seems to
be to ensure that radio and TV programs in Kurdish are fully controlled by the
state.
Not surprisingly, no prosecution has been initiated or proposed against Prime
Minister Erdogan for having condemned in strong words several court decisions.
Nor was General Büyükanit investigated for having declared immediately after one
of his men had been arrested in connection with the Semdinli affair, that the
man could not possibly have committed any crime. Not surprisingly, he said he
believed the PKK was behind the Semdinli bombing.
Some examples of recent freedom of expression cases are:
- the charges made against Hrant Dink and four other persons for “attempting to
influence the judiciary” (FIDH-HRA-HRFT, 28/12/2005. Their offence was to
criticize the sentence against Dink in October for “denigrating the Turkish
identity”. The charge followed a complaint by the nationalistic Union of
Jurists.
- A similar case was announced in December 2005 against five journalists (ibid).
Their offence was to criticize the court decision to ban the conference on the
Armenian issue. This case is also based on a complaint from the Union of
Jurists.
- Fatih Tas was sentenced to six months imprisonment for publishing “They say
you are missing”, about a journalist who went missing in the 1990s (Amnesty
International-AI-, 23/01/2006).
· Fatih Tas is also prosecuted for publishing a translation of “Spoils of War:
Human Costs of America’s Arms Trade” (Human Rights Watch, 01/12/2005). The book
evaluates the effects of the US arms industry, and is seen to be “insulting to
the memory of Kemal Atatürk”.
- Halil Altindere goes on trial on 13 April for a photograph exhibition that
allegedly “insults” the army (AI, 23/01/2006)
- On 6 April the case of Abdullah Yildiz will be heard, relating to his
translation of the book “The Witches of Smyrna”, which allegedly portrays Turks
in a bad light (ibid.).
- Worst of all, Ibrahim Kaboglu and Baskin Oran, former members of the Human
Rights Committee (under the Prime Ministry’s Office, will be tried on 15
February for the report produced on Minority and Cultural Rights, at the request
of the Prime Minister himself(!) (ibid.).
- The decision of the prosecutor of Diyarbakir to open investigations against 56
mayors from the Kurdish areas, following a letter urging Denmark not to close
down Roj TV.
- Even the Ministry of Interior has decided to make its own investigation of the
Roj TV case.
- Two former DEP Members of Parliament, Selim Sadak and Hatip Dicle are being
charged for praising PKK leader Öcalan, by terming his conditions in jail as
“isolation”, and saying that “this will never be accepted by the Kurdish
people”. If found guilty, they face a prison sentence of up to two years (TDN,
28/01/2006).
c) Freedom of Association and of Assembly – Political
Parties
Although some reforms have been made in the legislation, the harassment of
associations that are critical of government policies continues in multiple
forms. There is also a need for further reforms in the legislation, e.g. to
remove the ban on political parties “using languages other than Turkish” (read:
Kurdish).
The new law on associations and its implementing regulations have not prevented
the authorities from intervening in the internal affairs, and placing obstacles
for their registration, etc.
From November 2004 to December 2005, 55 cases and six investigations were
initiated against the executives of 14 branches of the Human Rights Association
(HRA). The chairman and board members of the Bingöl branch of the HRA were
subjected to some 92 investigations and 51 court cases since the branch was
opened in 2001. (HRFT, 29/12/2005). With a record like this, one may wonder how
the HRA has time and resources to carry out its important task in the Turkish
society.
The case against the teachers’ trade union, Egitim-Sen, is also illustrative of
the methods employed to control associations. Faced with a threat of being
closed down after a long battle in the courts, Egitim-Sen had no choice other
than deleting from its statutes the reference to its objectives including the
teaching of mother tongues. Its application to the European Court of Human
Rights will take a long time to be decided, and in the meanwhile the Turkish
state ideology will prevail, in spite of critical remarks from the EU and other
European institutions.
The case against the pro-Kurdish party DEHAP is continuing, although its
functions have been assumed by a new political party, in the traditional
response by party members to attempts by the authorities to close down parties
critical to the prevailing ideology.
Other examples of restrictive, harrassing and repressive practices are:
In June 2005 the Ankara Governor refused to authorize the Kurdish Democracy
Culture and Solidarity Association (Kürt-Der), claiming that its program “to
secure the social and cultural rights of Kurds” was unconstitutional.
In July the Bingöl governor fined the chairman of the local branch of HRA for
printing the association’s letterhead in Kurdish as well as in Turkish, in
breach of the requirement of the Associations Law that correspondence must be
exclusively in Turkish (HRW Annual Report 2005).
The infamous case from 1994 against Kurdish
MPs, Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan and Selim Sadak, is now in its 12th
year, with a retrial in its 3rd year. The last hearing was on 3 February, where
among other things the court refused the defendants’ request to have a witness
heard (TDN, 04/02/2006).
Hatip Dicle and Selim Sadak are in addition
charged under article 215 of the Penal Code, for having characterized the prison
conditions of PKK leader Öcalan as “isolation” (DIHA, 04/02/2006).
d) The Judiciary
By now, many efforts have been made by the EU to aid the Turkish authorities in
securing compliance, or at least better compliance, with European standards, at
great expense to European taxpayers.
Thousands of the members of the judiciary and the security forces have been
given training, manuals and directives about the requirements of European
standards. Even those who have not still participated in formal training
programs must by now have become aware that, for example, the European
Convention on Human Rights is a binding part of Turkish domestic law, and even
takes precedence over domestic law that may be in contradiction with domestic
law and jurisprudence.
Against this background, it is disturbing, to say the least, that prosecutors
and judges (with a few honourable exceptions) act as if they had no notion of
the stipulations of the Convention. For example, the courts fail to distinguish
between critical, but peaceful opinions, and opinions inciting to violence.
Another “technique” is to assume that a defendant who has expressed an opinion,
e.g. on mother tongue teaching, which coincides with statements by the PKK, is
himself a terrorist or at least a supporter of terrorism.
With this kind of “jurisprudence” and precedents, no peaceful discussion is
possible about important problems in society. It is also troublesome to observe
cases where the judiciary, instead of applying clear precedents from the
Strasbourg courts, follow signals from the military and other nationalistic
elements of the “deep state”.
Given all the training and information available to the judiciary, it cannot be
for lack of knowledge that they so often, for various reasons, deliberately
choose to follow the “deep state” logic. Paradoxically, it may be said that the
judiciary is too independent of the Government, which after all has given many
signals that it wishes the judiciary to comply with European standards.
The few selected cases referred to above give witness to this contradiction.
They also demonstrate that the task of change is enormous and that a resolution
most of all requires the uprooting of the nationalistic ideology.
As mentioned above, the numerous cases which shock the European public are just
the tip of an iceberg. Orhan Pamuk will never have to go jail. What is really
worrying is the huge amount of cases that do not catch the attention of the
media, the politicians and the EU.
These are the thousands who daily suffer torture and degrading treatment at the
hands of the security forces, harassment by the police and prosecutors, unjust
sentencing and cruel and inhuman treatment in prisons and detention centre.
Take the example of the man, apparently somewhat mentally disturbed, who had
spray-painted a few statues of Atatürk in some school yards. The sentence for
this crime against “the memory of Atatürk” was 22 years in prison! More than
many other cases, this one illustrates a judiciary gone blind by an
authoritarian and outdated ideology. It also illustrates the need to eliminate
this paranoia, which it must be hoped is not indicative of the sentiments of the
vast majority of the people of Turkey.
It is an unworthy and unacceptable situation that Turkish and international
NGOs, as well as the EU itself, have to play the role of some kind of a
“guardian of the court” in the numerous cases where freedom of expression has
been denied or punished. The Turkish authorities themselves have demonstrated
that they are unable, or unwilling, to prevent, or even to rectify, human rights
violations.
This failure is partly due to an unwillingness to change the nationalistic
ideology, and partly to strong pressures from the “deep state” and other
nationalistic elements. Whatever the reasons, the situation may be summarized,
as it was done recently by Hurriyet columnist Bekir Coskun: “We all know justice
doesn’t exist” (quoted in TDN 25/01/2006), or by TÜSIAD Chairman, Ömer Sabanci,
complaining about “courts making decisions as if there have been no changes made
in the laws concerning freedom of expression and cultural rights” (TDN
27/01/2006).
This appalling situation should not be allowed to persist. Europe must now
demand that Turkey must take much more vigorous steps than it has so far been
able or willing to take, in order to put its house in order. The Turkish system
of justice must be brought up to European standards, as a matter of urgency. To
take those steps is not the task of Europe, but of Turkey itself. Failure to
take such steps should have consequences for the accession negotiations.
e) The Role of the Military
Although on paper the privileged, political role of the military has been
reduced to some extent, the realities remain much the same. The military
obviously still feel free to intervene in the political agenda, with public
statements and other, more subtle forms of pressure. Various cases against
persons expressing opinions contrary to the military ideology have been opened
by prosecutors, eager to follow clear signals from the military.
A recent article in Foreign Affairs (January/February 2006) spells it all out
quite clearly. The article is written by a Turkish professor and two majors of
the Turkish Armed Forces. The article points out the cohesive nature of the
Armed Forces (TGS) and that the military “speaks with one voice”. The authors
have not even inserted the traditional caveat that the views expressed are their
own personal views. One can therefore safely assume that the article represents
the official view of the military. The article raises (and attempts to answer)
the question: How much further will the TGS go?
Among the many interesting statements of the TGS position are the following:
“None of the reforms the EU still requires of the Turkish government can be
achieved without the military’s backing”. In other words, the TGS retains
ultimate control and veto over Turkey’s foreign policy.
“It remains to be seen how much further the Turkish military leadership will be
willing to retreat”, i.e. that is the exclusive privilege of the TGS to
determine.
“The military fears that various lobbies can
unduly influence voters’ political choices … [and] is willing to tolerate these
social divisions only if [TGS] is tasked with monitoring them … but in no case
can they [the social divisions] be allowed to undermine the [TGS]. In plain
language, the TGS does not believe in democratic processes.
The article describes the various mechanisms
used to prevent “the officer class from being influenced by external ideologies
that could upset the military’s homogeneous worldview”. “The result is a
singular, self-replicating class of generals, towering over an institution with
a single mindset”. This philosophy is a far shot from the European perspective
of the role of armed forces, and is more reminiscent of authoritarian regimes
that Europe has experienced in the past.
After assuring that the TGS is in favour of EU
membership, the article states that “Whatever resistance it (TGS) may have
occasionally displayed … has stemmed .. from .. a significant degree of mistrust
toward some EU policies”. In other words, while assuring that the TGS is in
favour of membership of the EU, it mistrusts the EU policies.
The article quotes as a “major [emphasis added]
concession by the TGS”, a statement in its policy document from 2001, that the
country’s citizens “should have their cultural and local linguistic
characteristics be considered as individual rights and freedoms”. This “major”
concession is of course in line with the official ideology, which does not
recognise an obligation to respect and protect minorities (except those three
minorities recognised in the Lausanne Treaty of 1924), which is an essential
element of the accession criteria.
The article predicts that the military may go
along with further “moderate progress … so long, that is, as those reforms do
not challenge its [TGS’] internal integrity or that of Turkey at large. As the
country’s ultimate guardian, the military will carefully balance the EU’s
demands for reforms, especially (emphasis added) those regarding cultural
diversity [read “the Kurdish problem”], with national security”. This statement
confirms that the TGS will not give up its self-determined role as the “ultimate
guardian” and that the Kurdish problem is seen as the most precarious “red
line”.
Finally, the article concludes that the EU
“should not hasten to ask for the removal of the military’s remaining footholds
in Turkish civilian society … The TGS is likely to hold on to the tools and
methods [sic!] it has long used to keep soldiers in line … [and] will not
relinquish their proven methods until they are confident that the …
institutions, policies, and, ultimately, the promises of the EU are viable”. So,
we must conclude that the TGS will retain their traditional hold on society as
long as they wish.
One may safely assume that this article is representative of TGS policy, and
that the TGS will never negate its message. It reveals, in a coherent manner, a
military that has not wanted to understand what a democratic society is. For the
EU, it must be difficult to continue negotiations with the Turkish Government,
when it has been explained so explicitly by the “ultimate guardian” of Turkey
that the Government may say what it wishes in the negotiations, but the
decisions are at the end of the day taken, not by the Government but by the
military.
4. Concluding Remarks
The EUTCC believes that:
Considerable progress has been achieved by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen
criteria. Much remains to be achieved, both in terms of legislative reform, and
particularly in implementation It must be recognised by all actors involved that
the problems of achieving full compliance with the accession criteria are
enormous.
This is not merely a question of changing “hearts and minds” within the
bureaucracy, or fine-tuning of the legislation, as some believe.
The root of the problem is in the Turkish
nationalistic ideology, sanctified in the existing Constitution, and providing
the basis for the suppression of minorities and oppositional groups, in
particular of the Kurdish people...
In order to achieve European standards and meet the accession criteria, Turkey
must shed the state ideology that has prevailed for almost 90 years, and replace
it by a philosophy where cultural plurality is seen as positive, not as
threatening.
Uprooting the nationalistic ideology is no easy task, even if the will existed
among the politicians, the judiciary and the military. Unfortunately, so far
there are few signs that this is understood in Turkey.
At the political level, there is generally a
will to comply with the Copenhagen criteria, but the main hurdle is the
sensitive Kurdish problem, itself a result of the nationalistic ideology.
Unfortunately, the Government does not yet have
a realistic picture of the causes and magnitude of the problem, nor of the
solutions that may be found.
Furthermore, even in introducing moderate
reforms, the Government is torn between the demands of the EU and the demands of
the nationalistic ideology, pronounced by the military and other segments of the
“deep state”, including some of its own members and voters.
The Progress Report indicates the EU itself
does not consider the Kurdish problem as a main political problem hindering
compliance with the accession criteria. It blurs the primordial nature of this
problem, by referring to it as “the situation in the East and Southeast”. The
problem is not one of geography, nor even primarily of a “socio-economic
nature”, but goes much deeper.
The Kurdish problem is primarily of a complex, political nature. The problem
will not go away of its own. Nor can it be resolved through continued
repression.A solution requires fundamental changes in an antiquated state
ideology that has prevailed for more than 80 years.
The European experience and history have shown
that ethnic or nationalistic conflicts of a nature and gravity similar to the
Kurdish problem have never been resolved with guns, but through dialogue and
conciliation.
Whilst the reforms required for Turkey to comply with the accession criteria
must continue at an accelerated pace, the EU must in addition encourage and
insist that the underlying Kurdish problem must find its solution through a
dialogue between the parties involved.
The EU should, within the framework of the
accession negotiations, act as an honest broker in fostering the dialogue.
Elements of such a process, should include:
A roadmap prepared by the EU, and agreed
between the parties involved Benchmarking of the steps required, A “Truth
and Reconciliation” commission, In the final stages of the process, a general
amnesty for the Kurdish guerrilla.
Altea, Spain, 11 February, 2005
Jon Rud
Secretary General
EU Turkey Civic Commission
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