KurdistanObserver.com

Interview with Nechirvan Barzani
Jan, 28 2005
Financial Times

Gareth Smyth interviewed Nechirvan Barzani, prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (Arbil), and a member of the political bureau of the Kurdistan Democratic Party on January 26 in Arbil. The interview was in
Kurdish, translated by Fallah Mustafa and lightly edited.

Financial Times: This election is in part an assessment of the government of Iyad Allawi. What is your assessment?

Nechirvan Barzani: In my perception, within the short period of time since they took office and given the problems they have faced, to a great extent they have been successful.

Q: But they have made very little progress in improving security.

A: Security is a major problem in Iraq, but not to the extent it has been portrayed. Anyone who looks at the foreign media would think that nothing is being done. In the Shia areas, to a great extent, security is prevailing. In the Kurdish region, we do not have a security problem. The Sunni Arab areas have to an extent a security problem. And of course some of the problems have been brought to Iraq from outside. There are two forces at play � one is the will to bring democracy and to make progress in this country. The other is the will of international terrorism, which does not want progress to be made in this country. What is being done right now is to be expected, these are not major things. For 35 years a dictatorial regime has been ruling. After the fall of the regime, all the borders were opened for international terrorists to come. It needs time for this situation to be under control.

Q: You mention �international terrorism� but not the Baathists. Do you think the reversal of the de-Baathification programme [around April 2004] was a mistake? Does Iraq need to be de-Baathified?

A: The best decision Paul Bremer made was to have de-Baathification. Probably the mechanics for the implantation of that decision were not proper or good. As far as the decision was concerned, it was a very wise one.

Q: To stop de-Baathification?

A: No, to have de-Baathification.

Q: But de-Baathification was basically stopped, wasn�t it, in April 2004, shortly before the resumption of Iraqi sovereignty?

A: De-Baathification was a good thing. These are a group of criminals who were ruling in this country. They made all the Iraqi people suffer and carried out a lot of oppression. I would not say de-Baathification has been stopped, but rather that it has not been implemented. In my view it should be implemented. Of course there is the question of categorisation, who is included. [It should be] the high-ranking officials responsible for the crimes.

Q: Is it wrong to associate the Allawi government with ending de-Baathification?

A: They let it stay slow and this is a big mistake. In my view it should continue, it is a sound policy. Indeed having the committee to implement de-Baathification is separate from the TAL [Transitional Administrative Law, Iraq’s interim constitution]. Iyad Allawi does not have the power to remove this. Ahmed Chalabi is the head of that commission.

Q: Will the KDP support Iyad Allawi after the election in continuing as prime minister?

A: We have certain principles over who we support. Iyad Allawi is a good friend of ours and we have supported him as prime minister but there are certain principles which are important to us. Whoever becomes prime minister should believe in democracy, pluralism, federalism. And there is no doubt that we support a secular system that would separate politics and religion. These [principles] would be basis of
our support for any prime minister.

Q: Do you think Abd al-Aziz Hakim [leader of the Sciri, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and at the top of the main Shia list] believes in secularism?

A: He is a religious man. According to the TAL, the drafting of the constitution will be on the basis of consensus if there is consensus, whether he believes in it [secularism] or not, then there is room for agreement. There is no doubt that in Iraq the majority are Shia. Iraq has three main pillars Kurds, Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs. They [the Shia lists] will probably get a majority of the votes, but they cannot impose religious rule and I don’t think that’s in their minds. As I said, it will be on the basis of consensus and I don’t think there will be a problem.

Q: On your criteria, a wide range of people could be prime minister.

A: Yes, these are our criteria, and based on these we will deal with whoever is on the other side.

Q: Is it going to make much difference to the Kurds, and what the Kurds argue in Baghdad, if you get more or less votes in the election?

A: It is important how many votes we get, but there is a fact here. Iraq is made up on the basis of two main nationalities Kurds and Arabs. We are not Arabs, we are a different nation. That partnership should be taken into consideration, we have got our own characteristics. We will not accept that based on majority against minority we will be treated in certain ways. We are Kurds and they are Arabs for them to be Shia and Sunni is a different case. We are partners and will take part in the building of a new Iraq, which should be democratic. Our mission is to achieve this goal, to establish an Iraq that will enable its own people to live in peace and not be a threat to neighbouring countries.

Q: Will the Kurds push harder this time for one of the two senior positions?

A: If we want the government in Iraq to reflect the reality on the ground and the true composition of Iraq society, then it should be natural for one of these two senior posts to be filled by a Kurd. Otherwise the Kurds will not have the feeling that they are real partners and equal citizens in this country. The president is important, the prime minister is important, but also the speaker of the assembly in the coming period of time is a very important portfolio.

Q: Many people ask why the new Iraqi passport is in Arabic and English, but has no words of Kurdish. The foreign minister [Hoshyar Zebari] is a senior member of your party [the Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP].

A: This is one of the issues stipulated in TAL, which states very publicly that Kurdish is an official language. This is a matter of time, that they have not been able to set up a mechanism to address this issue. We are finding such a thing, not just with the passport, but in many other areas.

Q: It must be difficult to explain to Kurdish people that Hoshyar has been unable to have Kurdish in the passport.

A: If you refer to the Kurdish street, many things are difficult. We cannot find answers to these questions. We always try to tell them this is a matter of time.

Q: There is no Kurdish on the new money either.

A: Certainly, we will stress this point.

Q: And the TAL was not translated into Kurdish for, I think, two months.

A: Two months is not long, dealing with the mentality in Baghdad. The concept of federalism, they see as separation. It is not easy to change that culture and that mentality. It takes time, effort.

Q: What is the timescale for making decisions about Kirkuk?

A: In TAL, article 58 addresses the issue and a committee has been established [this month] to implement it. The head is Hamid Majid Musa [al-Bayati] the head of the Iraqi Communist party. It will start its mission. I think the issue is not that complicated. If the United States had been able to address that problem in the early days, and if Iyad Alalawi’s government had been able to but we realised that neither Baghdad nor Washington realised the depth of the sensitivity and feelings of the Kurds regarding Kirkuk. They thought time might solve the problem, but this was wrong. This is something that Kurds are not going to make any concessions over. All the words, the fights, the Kurds have had with the regime in Baghdad have been over Kirkuk. Our fear is that Baghdad is weak today and ready to make a solution, but tomorrow it might become stronger and refuse to solve it and there would be a major problem in Iraq. Our belief is that the issue should be addressed immediately and properly. Kirkuk is part of Kurdistan geographically and historically. People were brought by Saddam, settled. What we ask for is that these people be taken back where they came from. We do understand that they might not have the financial capability and that the Iraqi government should compensate them to resettle in their original areas. The Kurds and Turkomen who were expelled from their homes should be taken back. We believe it is possible for different ethnic groups to live together in Kirkuk.

Q: Is it possible to define who was brought as part of �Arabisation� and who went to Kirkuk just to get a job?

A: We have documents that prove how these people came. The majority brought were Shia. Of course we have been very careful in dealing with that, and we have never wanted problems between the Kurds and Shia. But it is very obvious from which city or which governorate people were brought, and which year they were brought. We know who was there naturally. There are few villages near Arbil with Arabs, who came as the result of a natural movement in 1961-2. We don’t ask for these people to go. But those who came as part of the process carried out by Saddam, we ask for these people to go.

Q: I have met Arabs more Sunnis, perhaps by chance who came to work for the oil company. Are they part of Arabisation?

A: The majority are Shia. If you talk about the Arabisation process as a whole in Kirkuk, it started in 1966 in Hawi Jah. But now you cannot change the reality in Hawi Jah, it is impossible. But Kirkuk should not have such a de facto reality, and we cannot keep telling our people to wait and wait while nothing is done.

Q: Which year are we going back to? Article 58 talks about normalisation. When was the situation normal in Kirkuk province?

A: After 1976, intensively, Saddam started Arabisation. Before then it had been there, but more intensely after 1976.

Q: So normalisation is back to 1976?
 

A: Of course, the changes in the boundaries of the governorate go back prior to 1968, when the Iraqi government gave different parts of Kirkuk to other provinces we are for the normalisation, going back before these changes were made.

Q: So the year of normalisation is 1968, for the administrative boundaries?

A: Exactly.
 

Q: The return to Kirkuk province of Chamchamal, Kifri

A: Alton Kupri, Tuz. They were all districts of Kirkuk that were detached. We are for their re-attachment. This problem is not just in Kirkuk, but elsewhere, in Mosul for example.

Q: Aqra is part of Mosul province. Yes, this is a complex problem and subject to negotiations?

A: Yes, for negotiations. People know the reality and they cannot deny it. This is a Kurdish area.

Q: So Arabs brought after 1968 as part of an Arabisation programme have to go back where they came from. What about someone who came to work in the oil
company after 1968?

A: The issue of an oil company is a different issue. It has thousands of employees and maybe a dozen Kurds. A few of them were not there as the result of Arabisation. But it is not only that. Those who were Kurds have been expelled.

Q: Another issue is that many people brought as part of Arabisation now have children born in Kirkuk. Do they have to go back to where their parents came
from?

A: The principle is important. Whether or not the children were born there is a different issue. These people have occupied property that belonged to other people and unrightfully settled. They should go back. And many of them are willing to go back right now, and are waiting for compensation.

Q: Can I shift now to the existing Kurdish-administered region? What is a realistic timetable for unifying the two administrations [one run by the KDP in Arbil, and one by the second main Kurdish party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Suleimania]?

A: After the election we will sit down together and address practical steps to unify the administrations.

Q: Why has this waited for the election?

A: The fault is that we have had a number of priorities that had to be dealt with. We are working within Iraq as a whole on joint lists for the assembly in Baghdad, ensuring Kirkuk is properly addressed. As the two administrations are functioning [in practice], we thought it better to focus on other issues that are important to the long-term interests of the Kurdish people.

Q: When will the two administrations be unified? What�s a realistic time table?

A: A few months. May.

Q: The administration has taken on many trappings of a state the Kurdish region is in some ways like a separate state and in some ways not. This has come up recently with regard to the airport at Arbil. Why are you receiving opposition to having international flights into Arbil, or Hawler [the Kurdish name for Arbil]?

A: That is a very good question, and we wish we had the answer. Many countries have two or three international airports. People can put the blame on technical requirements, so we have tried our best to meet these.

Q: Are the technical requirements being used as an excuse?

A: In my view, this is the reality. They make technical aspects such a big issue it is difficult to argue with them.

Q: Who is blocking Hawler becoming an international airport?

A: Baghdad.

Q: Not the neighbouring countries, not the international airline authorities.

A: We have just got the frequency identification for the airport, that should be sent to the US for certain equipment. Based on that frequency, it will be sent back here.The moment we receive this equipment, the airport will be able to operate. Certain ..(unintelligible) need Baghdad�s approval, and we are very seriously working on that.

Q: Is this part of the general attitude you talked about of Baghdad towards Kurdistan?

A: It is the same not-full understanding about the reality of the situation here.

Q: We ran a story in the FT in December that the Kurdistan Regional Administration had tried to invest a large sum of money outside the country. Is that correct, that you tried to place this money outside?

A: Another good question. This is unfounded and wrong. No money has been sent abroad. All the money is in the Kurdistan region, no money from Kurdistan has been sent abroad.Probably, talks have been made. But we have made a decision that the money belongs to the people. On the contrary, we ask that the remaining funds under the old oil-for-food programme [the UN scheme under which Iraq sold limited amounts of oil in return for food and medicine] be sent back to the region to be spent on the programme we intended.

Q: Have you had talks with Milestone Merchant Partners, and Barbour Griffiths Rogers about investing money outside?

A: We did not have any official talks about having investment outside.

Q: I should say that our report did not say there was anything improper in investing money outside the country � it is a perfectly legitimate and perhaps sensible strategy to invest money outside.

A: We are not saying it is not good. We did not have any official talks on that issue, and money has not been sent abroad. The problem is maybe that there are other groups or other parties that would like to use the matter in an election campaign against us, so that people ask why money has been sent abroad!

Q: Have you refused access to the accounts by the UN-appointed auditors?

A: We have not been approached they have not requested that.

Q: These are the accountants monitoring the DFI [Development Fund in Iraq, the fund established by the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority, into which remaining oil-for-food money was transferred along with proceeds from oil sales during the CPA’s rule]

A: They have not come here. They have not approached us officially. Otherwise we will take them anywhere they want.

Q: Is this money from the DFI, or money the Kurds argue they were owed under the oil-for-food programme?

A: This is money they owed the Kurds under the 986 [UN resolution establishing oil-for-food] programme.

Q: But the oil-for-food money went into the DFI?

A: Exactly. $1bn from our share was transferred to the DFI.
 

Q: This is $1bn remaining from the oil-for-food programme?

A: From the Kurdistan�s share, the 13 per cent share.

Q: So how much money was transferred to the KRG in Arbil in the final two
months or so of the CPA?

A: In total, it was $1.4bn. (Note: this appears to mean the total given to both the KDP-run administration based Arbil, and to the PUK-run administration in Suleimania)

Q: Are there public accounts for this, of what is done with this money?
 

A: Of the money given to us?

Q: Of what you’ve done with it, after it is been given to you?

A: It is present.

Q: None of it is been spent?

A: We wanted to have a master plan on how to spend this money in the region. We wanted to spend part of it as joint venture projects. We wanted some strategic, long-term projects this is why we need the money, and we ask for the remainder of the funds to be given back to the region.

Q: Why is this money 14 tonnes, wasn’t it being flown round in banknotes in helicopters?

A: One of our problems is that we do not have an international banking service. This is something we urgently need. We have approached many international banks about this.

Q: What conditions need to be fulfilled in order to have international banks?

A: Approval from Baghdad and for the bank to decide to come. We have a secure and safe environment [in Kurdistan]. But this comes back to the airport we need access, and this would encourage people to come and invest here.

Q: The lack of banking must cause enormous problems from 14 tons of money being flown from Baghdad to the security of ordinary people having to carry large amounts of cash around?
 

A: This is true. In all of Iraq there is no link to the international banking system. When you don’t have a proper banking system investors are much less willing to come.

Q: What has been the major achievement of the Kurds in the past 14 years [of de-facto self-rule]?

A: Self-rule in our own administration. This is a major achievement, and we have taken serious steps towards creating a civil society. The most important thing it has taught us is how to run our own affairs, how to live in a free and democratic atmosphere.

Q: How worried are you about security for the election?

A: Security is interrelated everywhere. To a great extent we have control over the situation.

Q: But you must be concerned about the Kurds in Baghdad, or Mosul?

A: Especially Mosul. On a daily basis Kurds have been killed in Mosul. They wanted to have the Kurds react and provoke what they can call civil war. So far, we have restrained ourselves and not reacted. We calm down our people and educate them, tell them not to go to many places.

Q: Has there been any real integration of the Kurdish peshmerga forces into the Iraqi security structure, the National Guard?

A: Yes, Kurds have joined the ING. The security issue is a priority. If we are approached and asked for help, we give it.

Q: Have you been approached?

A: In the areas where we have been approached, we have responded in the Mosul area. We have shown our readiness to do more if required. Of course, this is sensitive. They insist we are Iraqis and then sometimes they say we are Kurds we are caught in between! But security in Mosul is important for us. We want to be a factor for stability. The areas where there is security and stability are where we have a presence like the road from Mosul to Dohuk.

Q: And Kirkuk.

A: Yes.

Q: Is it too early to expect the systematic integration of the Kurdish peshmerga into the Iraqi army?

A: This is very difficult. We will not disband the peshmergas it is our right to protect our people. Our wounds are so deep that we want concrete and tangible guarantees. The peshmergas are the symbol of the protection of the dignity of the people. If we had listened to the calls from the Americans to disband and disarm the peshmergas then Kurdistan would have been like Fallujah and elsewhere in Iraq. The peshmergas have been a force for stability.

Q: The Americans didn’t stop you taking the heavy armour and other weapons the Iraqi army abandoned in Mosul and Kirkuk?
 

A: Everyone was taking weapons. It was good when they went into safe hands. They should have allowed us more opportunities to keep weapons from the hands of the enemy.