KurdistanObserver.com

Divided, Iraq Might Just Have A Chance
By Gareth Stansfield
Mar 19, 2006/  The Telegraph

Three years after the Coalition invasion, Iraq is now at a crucial turning point in its history. The country is on the precipice of civil war and possible fragmentation, but when future historians look back on the years following Saddam's removal from power, they will probably point to several events that precipitated the resurrection of the fissile Iraqi identities of religion, ethnicity and nationalism that have led to this crisis.

The first event was the deconstruction of the Iraqi state in the early period of the occupation, encouraging localised political groups to grab power in their "own" areas. At the same time, the demobilisation of the Iraqi army - originally believed to be a very good idea in order to prevent future military coups - was then seen to be a very bad idea, as the occupying forces were suddenly faced with determined insurgent enemies possessing local knowledge and enjoying localised support. And the Coalition forces themselves cannot escape blame: the suppression of Fallujah, and those photographs from the Abu Ghraib prison have all played their part.

However, future historians may also consider that the terrible situation of Iraq in 2006 had deeper origins. The trauma inflicted upon Iraqi society by a decade of sanctions following a decade of war with Iran; the existence of an all-pervasive totalitarian state that broke social bonds and played upon differences in society to preserve the regime; the continued Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi state, resulting in the emergence of a Kurdish de facto state in the north; and the rise in political Shi'ism in the 1990s were all in place long before George W Bush's attention was brought so forcibly to Iraq in the days following September 11.

Whatever the reasons, there is no doubting the critical position in which Iraq now stands. The destruction a month ago of the Shia shrines in Samarra - a site of immense spiritual importance - was an act aimed to further polarise sectarian loyalties. This it certainly did, with retaliatory killings taking place in Baghdad, and evidence of a new, harder line emerging from within the ranks of the Shia religious establishment.

This new wave of sectarian violence is taking place against a backdrop of an increasingly moribund political process. Following the elections of December 2005, the Iraqi National Assembly belatedly convened only this month, due to the inability of the political players to agree upon who would be Prime Minister.

The arguments surrounding the rights and wrongs of Ibrahim Ja'afari's candidature shed some light on the problems that will haunt Iraq in the coming months. The Kurds do not trust Ja'afari, as they consider that he has not implemented the process to decide upon the status of the northern oil-city of Kirkuk. And the Arab Sunnis object to Ja'afari, as they believe he did little to combat the atrocities being committed against them by Shia militia forces.

Although politicians and academics are arguing about whether there is already a civil war raging in Iraq, the fact is, violence remains localised and there still exists a great deal of sentiment and hope among ordinary Iraqis - as expressed by political, religious and social leaders - that calmer heads will still prevail in these difficult times. However, with scores of bodies being found almost every day, it seems their voices are being increasingly ignored. If it is not yet a civil war, it is not far off being one.

What now needs to be addressed is what to do if the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate. Does the Coalition sit back and watch what would be a chaotic unravelling of Iraq, with militias acting to defend their own communities and attack others (as is increasingly happening), and with the once cosmopolitan cities of Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra exposed to the horrors of sectarian blood-letting?

Or should the Coalition, perhaps, be proactive in enforcing a managed partition of Iraq, decentralising political authority to the Shia in the south, the Kurds in the north, and the Sunnis in the centre? The fact is, this has already happened to a great extent, with the Kurdistan Region now codified, and Basra effectively out of the political orbit of Baghdad.

So the real questions are: How would this "regional" dimension be managed, particularly with regard to Iranian influence not only in the south (where it is already very prominent), but also in Kurdistan, where Turkey also has key national interests at stake? And how should security in "divided" cities be managed?

From the perspective of the Coalition, there are few good options left at this point. A lack of action and the withdrawal of an outside military presence would almost certainly see militias turn on militias (even within their own communities - it is quite likely that the men of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq would turn upon their Shia brothers in Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi army), and the most powerful political parties act to create political realities on the ground (such as the Kurds taking Kirkuk, once and for all).

A re-drawing of the map of Iraq, identifying communities according to their religion or ethnicity, would reek of neo-imperialism. It would also generate considerable political opposition - with the risk of military intervention - in the wider region. Yet it would perhaps result in a less chaotic situation in Iraq (or what we now consider "Iraq") itself.

Put simply, from the perspective of the UK and US, none of the options available can be considered to be good. We have got to the point where the country is on the verge of collapse, and the only options left are unsavoury and problematic. What was unthinkable three years ago - a partitioned or rigidly federal state - might now be the only hope.