Iran, the United States and Potential Iraq
Deal-Spoilers
May 29,
2007
Stratfor
By Reva Bhalla
After 27 years of frozen relations, the United States and Iran held their first
high-level direct talks in Baghdad on May 28 to negotiate a plan on how to
stabilize Iraq. U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and his Iranian
counterpart, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, traded accusations about who was the bigger
destabilizing force in Iraq. But by the end of the four-hour meeting, both
described the negotiations as a positive first step in bringing the two sides
together to stabilize Iraq. Kazemi-Qomi even said there probably would be a
follow-up meeting within a month if he gets the OK from Tehran.
Iran and the United States evidently have come a long way since the spring of
2003, when Washington double-crossed Tehran on the two countries' original
understanding that a pro-Iranian, Shiite-dominated Iraq would be allowed to
emerge in exchange for Iran's help in effecting regime change in Baghdad. When
the United States removed two hostile Sunni regimes from Iran's border -- the
Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq -- the Iranians knew they had
to check the United States on the regional chessboard so Washington understood
any U.S. exit strategy from Iraq would have to come through Tehran. Only then,
Tehran reasoned, could Iran use Iraq as a launchpad to extend Iranian influence
in the Arab world.
Feeling a deep sense of betrayal, the Iranian government carried out a variety
of deadly maneuvers that ultimately convinced Washington that neither the
Iranians nor the Americans were going to succeed in gluing Iraq back together on
their own. The negotiations are still marred by mutual distrust, but after four
years of explosive negotiating tactics, Iran and the United States have reached
a point at which both sides have acknowledged they cannot afford to avoid each
other if they want to avoid their worst-case scenarios in Iraq.
As the negotiations grow in intensity, so does the noise. The lead-up to the May
28 talks was punctuated by a series of interesting jabs as each side sought
leverage against the other. While the United States sent nine warships with
17,000 troops into the Persian Gulf (which the U.S. military deliberately
referred to as the Arabian Gulf in the official press release on the naval
exercises) and stepped up threats of broadening sanctions against Tehran due to
the latter's nuclear activities, Iran continued broadcasting its atomic advances
and announced it had uncovered Western-run spy rings inside the Islamic
republic. The United States is still holding onto five Iranian officials
arrested in the northern Iraqi city of Arbil in January as bargaining chips in
talks with Iran. Iran has responded with a series of arrests of
Iranian-Americans affiliated with think tanks on allegations they are dissidents
working to topple the clerical regime. These belligerent tactics are all part of
the game, and will flare up even further as the negotiations grow more serious.
The Meat of the Matter
It now becomes all the more critical to cut to the meat of these talks: the
negotiating terms put forth by Washington and Tehran over how each plans to fix
Iraq.
Iran handed over a proposal to Crocker during a brief encounter at the May 5-6
Sharm el-Sheikh summit in Egypt, but also chose to unofficially publicize its
terms for Iraq through the Saudi-owned, British-based daily Al Hayat. The
Iranian Foreign Ministry likely chose Al Hayat, a major Arab news outlet, to
make a back-channel broadcast of what concessions it is prepared to make to
allay Sunni concerns in the region.
In sum, this Iranian proposal called for a non-rushed withdrawal and relocation
of U.S. troops to bases inside Iraq, a rejection of all attempts to partition
Iraq, a commitment by the Sunni bloc to root out the jihadists and
acknowledgement by Washington that the Iranian nuclear file cannot be uncoupled
from the Iraq negotiations. In return, Iran would rein in the armed Shiite
militias, revise the de-Baathification law and Iraqi Constitution to double
Sunni political representation, create a policy to allow for the fair
distribution of oil revenues (particularly to the Sunnis) and use its regional
influence to quell crises in areas such as Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian
territories.
The terms put forth by the Iranians are so close to the U.S. position on Iraq
that, with little exception, they could have been printed on State Department
stationary and no one would have noticed the difference. If these are the terms
Washington and Tehran are in fact discussing, then we are witnessing an
extraordinary turn in the Iraq war in which the U.S. and Iranian blueprints for
Iraq are finally aligning. It does not surprise us, then, that Crocker said
after his meeting in Baghdad that the Iranian position "was very close to our
own" at the level of policy and principle.
The Spoilers
The prospect of Washington and Tehran warming up to each other, and of the
United States potentially regaining its military bandwidth in the
not-too-distant future, is enough to put a number of serious actors into a
frenzy. With the exception of the jihadists, most of the actors in question see
an Iranian-U.S. accommodation over Iraq as inevitable, and have little choice
but to strive to shape what would otherwise be an imposed reality in the coming
months -- leaving substantial room for error in these negotiations. The Iraqi
Sunnis and Arab states, in particular, will not necessarily sabotage the talks,
but they will be working to secure Sunni interests and contain the extent to
which Iran emerges as the primary beneficiary of any deal it works out with the
United States over Iraq.
Jihadists
Within Iraq, the transnational jihadists have the most immediate concerns. A
political settlement in Baghdad inevitably would involve a concerted effort by
Iraq's Shia and mainstream Sunnis to uproot the jihadists and deprive them of
the chaotic security conditions needed for their operations. The apex leadership
of al Qaeda hiding out along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is also betting on
continued bedlam in Iraq to keep the transnational jihadist movement alive, and
will not be happy to see U.S. forces beefed up in the South Asia theater once a
deal is sealed in Iraq. Violence aimed at heightening sectarian tensions to
derail the negotiations -- particularly attacks aimed at inflaming the Shia --
will escalate substantially over the next few weeks and months in Iraq.
High-value political targets also likely will be targeted for assassination in
an effort to disrupt the leadership structure of the respective factions.
Iraqi Shia
The Iranians face a daunting task in whipping Iraq's Shiite bloc into shape to
follow through with Tehran's commitment to quell sectarian attacks and
consolidate Shiite political power in Iraq for the first time in the country's
history. Factionalism is already hardwired into the structure of the Iraqi
Shiite community, whose loyalties are spread among the three largest political
groups -- the (newly named) Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council, Hizb al-Dawah and the
al-Sadrite bloc, as well as a number of smaller Shiite groups in southern Iraq,
such as the Fadhila party. The intra-Shiite rivalries within and between these
groups are enough to give anyone a headache, but Iran is well aware that
violence and a good deal of oil money will be needed to bring the Iraqi Shia in
line and make these negotiations work. Though the main political groups are more
comfortable with the idea of working with Iran, Tehran has to play its cards
carefully to ensure it does not trigger nationalist Arab sentiment among the
Shiite actors, who already are deeply suspicious of Iran's intentions and have
the arms and access to Iraq's southern oil fields to use as tools for stirring
up trouble.
Iraqi Sunnis
Though not nearly as fractured as the Iraqi Shia, the Sunni landscape in Iraq
has plenty of cracks of its own to make these negotiations troublesome. The
Sunni factions in play include:
The existing political blocs, divided between the Islamist Iraqi Accord Front
and the secular-leaning Iraqi National Dialogue Front;
The tribal groups, such as Anbar Salvation Council, that are actively fighting
transnational jihadists to get a seat at the negotiating table;
The Sunni religious establishment, led by the hard-line Association of Muslim
Scholars of Iraq that has close links with the insurgent groups and has become
increasingly anti-Iranian in recent weeks;
The Sunni nationalist insurgents, who are looking for an acceptable opening into
the political process, but remain distrustful of Shiite intentions.
The Iraqi Sunnis know they have to drive a hard bargain in these talks to ensure
that Iraq's Sunnis are well-integrated in the state political and security
apparatus to counter the Shiite majority. And they will continue to rely on
explosives during the talks to make sure their demands are heard. Competing
factions within the Sunni bloc and resistance from their former jihadist allies
will only further complicate these negotiations, but unlike the jihadists, these
Sunni groups are not opposed in principle to a deal that includes the Iranians
-- they actually want negotiations.
Iraqi Kurds
By the looks of the Iranian proposal, the Kurds have plenty to worry about.
Expanding Sunni political representation and changing the constitution to allow
for a more "fair" distribution of oil resources leaves the Kurdish bloc in an
all-too-familiar scenario in which Kurdish interests will be sacrificed by the
United States to protect the interests of Iraq's neighbors.
Thus far, the Kurds have used the distraction of Sunni-Shiite bloodletting
farther south to consolidate power between the two main rival Kurdish blocs (an
extremely rare occurrence) and push forward with Kurdish autonomous demands to
open Iraq's northern oil fields to foreign business. Once Iraq's Shiite and
Sunni blocs reach some level of a political understanding in Baghdad, their
attention will soon turn to their common adversary in the north, leaving the
Kurds to face familiar moves by the Iraqi government to suppress Kurdish
autonomy. The Kurds will need to drive a hard bargain by pushing through a
Kirkuk referendum by year's end and resisting radical changes to the
constitution and pending hydrocarbons legislation that threaten to put Iraq's
undeveloped fields in the north under state control. The biggest threats the
Kurds could make to a U.S.-Iranian deal over Iraq would involve withdrawing
Kurdish support for U.S. forces or threatening to pull out of the government.
But in the end, a compromise looks inevitable simply because the Kurds have
nowhere else to turn.
Ultraconservatives in Washington and Tehran
There are ultraconservative factions in both Tehran and Washington that are not
nearly as enthused about a U.S.-Iran rapprochement, and could use their
influence to complicate the negotiations. Rumor has it that in Iran there are
major disagreements brewing between the president and other senior Iranian
officials, particularly on foreign policy matters. There are also growing
indications that the apex of the clerical establishment is making moves to
sideline Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and weaken the influence of his
ultraconservative faction as a preventative measure to ensure progress in these
talks. Though Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has thus far managed
the deep divisions within the Iranian establishment between the
ultraconservative and pragmatic conservative factions, his ability to contain
these divisions is held hostage by his failing health.
Meanwhile, hard-line elements in Washington are actively spreading information
in an allegedly covert campaign signed off on by U.S. President George W. Bush
to topple the clerical regime. These actors are more interested in effecting a
policy of regime change rather than in a rapprochement with Iran, and they view
the negotiations as little more than a smoke screen for a covert campaign to rid
the Islamic republic of its ruling ayatollahs. These rumors threaten to fuel
even more distrust between the two sides while the negotiations are in full
swing, especially as Iran's greatest fear is that it will end up being
backstabbed all over again once Washington recovers from Iraq and has enough
bandwidth to entertain military options.
Sunni Regional Powers
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states are extraordinarily nervous about the idea
of having the United States and Iran conduct exclusive meetings over a matter
that directly concerns their national security interests. As the leader of the
Sunni Arabs, the Saudis believe they have every right to be part of the formal
negotiating process, but they also see the inevitability of the United States
and Iran working toward an Iraq settlement. With the most at stake, the Saudi
government normally would be screeching in protest during these U.S.-Iranian
bilateral meetings, but instead it is keeping quiet. For now, the Saudis have to
rely on the United States to ensure their demands for Sunni representation and
Iranian containment are heard.
Meanwhile, the Iranians evidently are working to allay Sunni Arab fears by
publicizing Tehran's Iraq proposal (with considerable concessions to Iraq's
Sunnis) in the mainstream Arab press and stepping up diplomatic engagements with
Iran's Sunni neighbors in the Gulf. But the more the Iranians speak of arming
and training the Iraqi army, the more the Saudis have to worry about. The House
of Saud does not want to be looking at a scenario down the road in which U.S.
troops have withdrawn from Iraq while Iran uses its militant proxies there to
create an excuse to intervene militarily, putting Iranian troops within sight of
Saudi Arabia's oil- and Shiite-rich Eastern province. The Saudis are also not
looking forward to the day when war-hardened Saudi jihadist veterans in Iraq
return home to wage attacks in the kingdom. Though the Saudis might see an Iran-U.S.
deal as inevitable, they will keep their ties to the full spectrum of Sunni
militants to use as their main deal-breaker should an Iraq settlement fail to
address their interests.
Syria
Syrian President Bashar al Assad also probably is lying awake at night over
these U.S.-Iran talks. The Alawite-Baathist regime in Syria loved the idea of
its allies in Tehran expanding Shiite influence while the United States remained
far too militarily occupied in Iraq to bother with Syria. The insurgency in Iraq
also provided Syria with a vital pressure release valve for Sunni militants in
the country. Like Riyadh, the regime in Damascus does not want to see jihadists
returning home from Iraq to carry out attacks on native soil.
Despite these concerns, the Syrians are hoping their alliance with Tehran will
pay off and result in serious recognition and security assurances from the
United States. For this to happen, Syria has to prove it is an integral piece of
this Iraq deal by showing it possesses the ability to clamp down on insurgent
traffic (by funneling jihadists into Lebanon for now). While Syria offers
limited cooperation over Iraq to show its powers, the al Assad regime will
become further emboldened to secure its interests in Lebanon, where Syria's
priorities are rooted.
Russia
But the player with perhaps the most to lose is not even located in the Middle
East. That player is Russia. At first glance, Russia is an odd party to even be
involved in the Iraqi imbroglio. It has no troops in country and, no matter what
happens to Iraq in the long run, Baghdad has no impact on anything Russian.
Certainly Moscow was friendly with the previous government, but not to the
degree that Saddam Hussein's fall appreciably impacted Russian political or
economic interests.
Russia does, however, have two horses in this race.
The first relates to the Iranian nuclear program, which lists the Russian-built
Bushehr power plant as its crown jewel. Despite Iranian protestations to the
contrary, Tehran's nuclear program is largely a result of Russian technology
sharing. And, should the Russians walk away, the Iranian program will have
suffered a monumental setback. Similarly, so long as Russia has not finished the
reactor at Bushehr, the West cannot ignore Moscow's ability to function as an
interlocutor in Tehran. So long as the facility is "under construction," Russia
has leverage over both parties. As soon as Russia's technicians finish, however,
that leverage evaporates.
Second, and far more important: So long as the bulk of the United States' and
Iran's political and military attention is absorbed in Iraq, neither has any
bandwidth to deal with other issues. Iran has deep and lasting interests in
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan -- states of critical interest to Moscow -- yet
Iran's preoccupation with Iraq has prevented Tehran from capitalizing on recent
opportunities. Similarly, the United States has faced no foe more challenging
than the Soviet Union and its Russian successor. In that vein, there is no
country more desirous of challenging Russia's ongoing efforts to rewire European
security arrangements in its own favor than the United States. But that requires
a Washington not consumed by the black hole Iraq has become.
A Rough Road Ahead
It took four years of heavy-handed negotiating tactics to bring U.S.-Iranian
dealings over Iraq out of the back channels and into the public view.
That was half the battle.
The aligning of the U.S. and Iranian proposals for Iraq marks a significant
inflection point in the war, but we still question whether the three big players
negotiating this deal -- Washington, Tehran and Riyadh -- can trust each other
enough and carry enough sway among Iraq's state actors to get them to cooperate
and actually produce results on the ground. Once you throw the spoilers into
this equation, along with a centuries-old Arab-Persian rivalry centered on
containing the very rise that Iran is anticipating this deal will yield, the
prospect of a U.S.-Iranian accommodation over Iraq coming to fruition does not
look so good. Our hopes are not completely dashed, but we do see a bumpy road
ahead.
