Mohammad Noureddine 
Special to The Daily Star
Mar 12, 2002

With the March 19 date put forward by the Turkish government for announcing its “National Program” ­ designed to prepare the country for European Union (EU) membership ­ fast approaching, a number of domestic arguments relating to accession have emerged almost simultaneously. 

Most of these arguments involve the offshoots of a single issue: the “Kurdish Question.” There is the argument over the death sentence passed on Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan, and the one over teaching and broadcasting in the Kurdish language. Another, more recent, dispute revolves around whether it would be beneficial to allow the PKK to turn itself into a political party. 

Ever since Turkey was accepted as a candidate for EU membership back in December 1999, all conditions put forward by Brussels in its “Accession Partnership Agreement” document seemed achievable ­ including such thorny issues as settling the Cyprus problem. All, that is, except one: Kurdistan and the Kurds. 

For Turkey, the Kurdish Question lies beyond the realm of wills and intentions. It is intimately connected to the very roots of Kemalist ideology, and touches on such sensitive matters as the nature of the Turkish nation state that was established in 1923 to replace the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. In this context, the Kurds are only seen as an integral part of the Turkish people. 
According to sources in the Turkish Parliament, “even the problem of the army’s role in politics can be solved. But the army can never betray the ‘Turkish concept’ on which the state was built. Consequently, the army will never tolerate any form of broadcasting in Kurdish, for example, nor accept teaching in Kurdish.” 

Yet the effects of the so-called “Kurdish factor” are not limited to cultural and linguistic issues. There is also a political dimension that is being increasingly discussed these days. 

The majority of Turkish public opinion ­ along with the country’s political and cultural elite ­ believe the PKK, having lost its military teeth and with its leader imprisoned, is trying to achieve through politics what it failed to achieve in 15 years of violence. This much is obvious. The only difference is that during the years of armed struggle, the PKK called for the creation of an independent Kurdish state. Now, though, Ocalan is calling for a democratic Turkish republic in which Turks and Kurds live equally side-by-side. The republic Ocalan has in mind would do away with Kurdish urges for secession and/or independence. 
Thanks to 80 years of Kemalist policies that denied the very existence of a Kurdish minority in Turkey, as well as to constant Kurdish rebellions against Ankara, an entrenched state of hatred and mistrust now exists between the two communities that cannot be easily eradicated. Nevertheless, a confidence-building process has begun in earnest, albeit under the pressure of EU conditions. 

Columnist Taha Akyol wrote in Milliyet recently that “20 or 30 years ago, the term ‘Kurds’ wasn’t even mentioned in most Turkish dictionaries. When the Kurds made their great exodus to the Turkish border in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, the Turkish media first called them ‘northern Iraqis,’ before settling on ‘Iraqi Kurds.’ Then-Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel’s recognition in the fall of 1991 of the ‘Kurdish reality’ was nothing more than rhetoric.” 
Everything changed when the EU presented the Accession Partnership Agreement document. The Turks realized that they had to take definite steps to grant the Kurds their cultural rights. The document had the effect of boosting the courage of Turkey’s politicians and intellectuals to embark on a widespread discussion of the EU’s demands regarding the Kurdish issue. Discussing the Kurdish Question was no longer seen as a betrayal of Kemalist principles. This was a major turning point. 

After Turkish society got accustomed to debating the use of the Kurdish language in education and broadcasting, voices began to be heard questioning whether the PKK should be allowed to operate as a political party under current legislation. 

The idea behind these calls was to end the legend that had grown around the PKK. If the Kurdish party were allowed to contest parliamentary elections in Turkey, it wouldn’t be able to muster any real support from among the Kurdish community and would thus be exposed. This idea was propagated by Minister of State Mehmet Kececiler, a member of Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz’s Motherland Party. Kececiler is one of the biggest advocates of easing restrictions on the use of Kurdish. “The Kurdish question,” he declared, “cannot be solved by prohibitions.” 

In a recent interview with the Turkish newspaper Aksam, Kececiler was asked his opinion of the attempts to turn the PKK into a mainstream political party. The minister replied: “It is better for us to have the PKK involved in politics than fighting in the mountains. Why don’t you have confidence in our politicians? Why don’t you trust our Kurdish citizens? No one will vote for the PKK. We will beat them at the ballot box. Let them come. Under the existing laws, we will beat them fair and square. Kurdish parties that were de facto extensions of the PKK have already tried their luck in elections. Where are they now? Turkey’s entry into the EU will solve the PKK problem once and for all.” 

Many Turks saw Kececiler’s words as an overt attempt to persuade Kurds, especially in the southeast of the country, to vote for his Motherland Party in the next elections scheduled for 2004. But nevertheless that doesn’t preclude seeing his comments as cracks in the wall of opposition to Kurdish rights. 
In fact, Yilmaz himself said it was wrong to believe that using Kurdish would divide Turkey. 

The Motherland Party leader also said that “by removing the obstacles that stand in the way of broadcasting and teaching in Kurdish, we are depriving terrorists and secessionists of a very important weapon. In this regard, Turkey needs more courage.” 

As expected, Kececiler’s call for the PKK to be allowed into politics was bitterly attacked by the Nationalist Movement, one of the parties making up the ruling coalition. Ismail Kose, who leads the Nationalist bloc in Parliament, described Kececiler’s words as indicative of an “Ozal-style mindset” (the reference is to former President Turgut Ozal). 
“It is thanks to this mindset,” said Kose, “that the country is in this mess. How can a government minister say such words? He has equated the Turkish people with the PKK.” 

Meanwhile, Selim Ansarioglu, deputy leader of Tansu Ciller’s True Path Party, said Kececiler was talking nonsense. Motherland, Ansarioglu said, was preparing to become a partner with the Kurdish HADEP, itself an off-shoot of the PKK, in the next parliamentary elections. 
For his part, Taha Akyol described Kececiler’s intentions as “good” but said he was going about the issue in the wrong way. Akyol said it was wrong for a government minister to call for a terrorist organization to turn into a political party. 

Milliyet commentator Hasan Cemal, meanwhile, said that “calls for enabling the PKK to participate in politics are wrong; this will only serve to strengthen secessionists and all those who don’t want Turkey to be strong.” 
But Cemal also called for “broad-minded policies vis-a-vis ethnic problems. Instead of marginalizing others, we should involve them in the political game.” Cemal called for the formation of a Kurdish political party that defends Kurdish rights, but at the same time respects Turkey’s unity. 
The biggest surprise, however, came from exiled Kurdish leader Kemal Burkay, who accused HADEP of “trying to integrate with official ideology,” and the PKK itself of “never having a free will.” The PKK, Burkay said, “was always influenced by outside forces at the forefront of which was the Turkish state. Today, there is no difference to be discerned between PKK ideology and that of the state. Both are Kemalists and both support a unified Turkish state.” 

The Turkish government hasn’t taken any practical steps yet to grant the Kurds their cultural rights. Yet despite that, and despite the fact that conventional Turkish thinking vis-a-vis this issue hasn’t changed, it has nevertheless been subjected to an unprecedented level of public debate. 
In fact, the debates that have been going on concerning the death penalty, the Kurdish language, and the PKK indicate that Turkey is indeed standing on the threshold of a new era ­ if Turkey is really serious in its efforts to join the EU and to be part of the European system of values that recognizes the cultural, and indeed political, rights of minorities. 

Mohammad Noureddine is an expert on Turkish affairs