May 23, 2002

KRGFROM his compound overlooking Arbil, Massoud Barzani, leader of the stronger of the two Kurdish factions running northern Iraq, feels the weight of an approaching, and crucial, decision. He and his arch-rival, Jalal Talabani, who controls the eastern part of the Kurdish enclave, had just returned from meeting American officials in Germany to discuss the Kurds’ possible contribution to an Iraqi “regime-changing” operation. Mr Barzani is determined not to take his people into anything “that fails to guarantee their security and their rights as equal citizens in a federal, democratic Iraq.”

With some 50,000 men under arms and controlling an area roughly the size of Switzerland, the Iraqi Kurds are the strongest opposition group inside Iraq. But, unlike the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, they lack sophisticated weaponry and they are encircled by unremittingly hostile neighbours. With Iraqi tanks parked just ten kilometres outside Arbil, it is easy to understand why Mr Barzani and many of Iraq’s 3.6m Kurds are jittery.

They remember what happened when George Bush senior exhorted them to rebel against Saddam Hussein at the end of the Gulf war and then failed to support them. They have far more to lose today. Protected by American and British air power, and to the consternation of Turkey and Iran (both of which have bigger Kurdish minorities than Iraq), the Iraqi Kurds are in the process of building a modern country.

From various sources of income, including a share of Iraq’s oil-for-food deal and revenue from Iraq’s illicit border trade with Turkey, dirt roads have been transformed into silky highways, hundreds of schools and hospitals have been renovated, and others have been built from scratch. Iran, Turkey and Syria keep physical access to the enclave under strict control, but the Internet and satellite communications are helping the Kurds to overcome their forced isolation.

“We are experiencing a Kurdish renaissance,” boasts Saeed Barzinji, a French-trained law professor who runs Salahaddin University in Arbil. But Barham Saleh, a senior official working for Mr Talabani, knows that “We cannot envisage a free Kurdistan...it is our fate to live within the borders of Iraq. Unless we have a democratic government in Baghdad, our hard-earned gains will be destroyed.”

As speculation about American intervention grows, Kurds living in America and Europe, who have helped spearhead the region’s construction boom, are shying away from further investment. And aid agencies give warning that beneath the veneer of budding prosperity, the Kurdish economy remains very fragile, largely dependent on UN handouts. Military action of any kind could result in a humanitarian crisis for which no one is prepared.

Kurdish leaders seem to be convinced that sooner or later the Bush administration will remove the Hussein regime, and that they themselves will go along with the plans. But apart from the renovation of a few old Iraqi military airfields, there are no signs of any preparation. The Kurds are more interested in extracting a high price from America, including support for a future federal arrangement as the condition for any help they might give.

Turkey sees things differently American officials have held off from making any such pledge. They have two reasons. First, the Iraqi Kurds will have to work out their future status with their fellow Iraqis. Second, Turkey, America’s good ally, has given warning that any hint of Kurdish independence in northern Iraq would be met with a military response.

Over the past decade, America has looked the other way as Turkish troops made regular forays into the Kurdish enclave in pursuit of Turkey’s Kurdish rebels from the now supposedly defunct Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Some 250 Turkish military men are permanently stationed in the enclave, partly in order to arm and train a Turcomen militia based in Mr Barzani’s area. The presence of Turcomens—there is anything between 800,000 and 2m in Iraq—serves as a pretext for Turkey’s intervention to “protect” its Turkic cousins.

Relations between the Turks and Mr Barzani have sharply deteriorated in recent months, mainly over the latter’s refusal to continue to collaborate in military operations. Turkey has hit back by more or less halting the illegal import of Iraqi diesel through Kurdish-controlled areas since February, a move that has had a severe impact on the local economy. In addition, Turkey has been providing modest aid to Mr Talabani in a bid to dilute Mr Barzani’s strength. This, in turn, has prompted Iran, another difficult neighbour, to indulge in its own trouble-making by allowing a murderous Islamic group, Ansar al-Islam, to operate in the impenetrable mountain terrain near the Iranian border.

The encouraging news is that the rival Kurdish factions appear to be resisting attempts by external powers to pitch them back into fratricidal fighting. This came to an end in 1996, after Mr Barzani invited Mr Hussein’s troops to drive out Mr Talabani’s forces from Arbil. While they were at it, the Iraqis also killed hundreds of Iraqi Arabs linked to a CIA-backed opposition group. While there is little likelihood of the Kurdish leaders returning to the power-sharing agreement sealed by their first and only parliamentary election in 1992, co-operation between them is growing.

They are speaking to the Americans largely with one voice. “We Kurds have never been this strong,” said Hoshyar Zebari, an aide to Mr Barzani. “It is time to stop being pawns in other people’s games, to stand united and think big.”